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Business Institutions play a fundamental role in ensuring and preserving the common 
good of society. The underlying philosophy of global society and its institutions half a 
century after the Second World War still remain largely divided between capitalism and 
socialism. The capitalists seemed to have won when the ‘iron curtain’ fell in 1989. Was 
this the case? Not everyone has progressed since the end of the Cold War. Since 1990 
some 55 countries have had declining per capita incomes, while inequality has risen 
within and between countries. It is too soon to say whether global capitalism will be 
saved from itself. This thesis is a theoretical analytical attempt at providing an 
assessment of business institutions from the perspective of the social common good as 
understood in the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophic tradition. 
Key Words: Common Good, Business Institutions, The firm, Social Structure, State, 
Capitalism. 
Las Empresas juegan un papel fundamental a asegurar y preservar el bien común de la 
sociedad. La filosofía fundamental de la sociedad global, medio siglo después de la 
Segunda Guerra Mundial, todavía se quede en gran parte dividido entre el capitalismo y 
el socialismo. Los capitalistas parecidos haber ganado cuando el "telón de acero" se 
cayó en 1989. ¿Fue el caso? No todos progreso desde el fin de la Guerra Fría. Desde 
que 1990 unos 55 países han tenido rentas por habitante declinantes, mientras la 
desigualdad ha subido dentro y entre países. Es demasiado pronto decir si el capitalismo 
global será éxito. Esta tesis es una tentativa analítica teórica en proporcionar una 
evaluación de Empresas desde la perspectiva del bien común social comprendió como 
en la tradición Aristotélico-Tomístico de la filosófica. 
Palabras Claves: Bien Común, La Empresa, Instituciones, Estructura Social, El 
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“SITUATING AND EVALUATING  
INSTITUTIONS IN THE COMMON GOOD” 
AN INTRODUCTION 
There seems to be an unwritten principle in capitalistic societies that “…There is one and 
only one responsibility of business… to increase its profits…”1 The 2008 world financial 
crisis, largely perpetrated by unethical business practice in post-modern western societies, 
gave an opportunity to citizens to reconsider the tenets of capitalism and free markets. Part 
of the discussion that ensued was the reassessment of the scope and role of corporate 
institutions’ in society. The underlying philosophy of society and its institutions half a 
century after the Second World War still reminisced over the cold-war between capitalist 
and socialist societies. The capitalists seemed to have won when the ‘iron curtain’ fell in 
1989. Was this the case? To wit, Douglas Cassel points out that while global prosperity 
has risen dramatically in recent decades, not everyone has progressed since the end of the 
Cold War. Since 1990 some 55 countries have had declining per capita incomes, while 
inequality has risen within and between countries. It is too soon to say whether global 
capitalism will be saved from itself by regulation, just as American national capitalism 
may have been saved by the New Deal reforms it opposed. As Pope John Paul II has 
warned, the world must not succumb to a "radical capitalist ideology" which "blindly 
entrusts" social problems to market forces2. 
In the world political stage the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United 
Nations General Assembly both point out that "Everyone, as a member of society, is 
entitled to the realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and 
                                                 
1 Donaldson, Thomas and Werhane, Patricia, Ethical Business; New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1983; p. 180; 
quoting Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962. 
2 Cassel, Douglas, Human rights and Business Responsibilities in the Global Market Place; Business Ethics 
Quarterly, Volume 11, Issue 2. ISSN 1052-150X, 2001. pp. 261-274: p 261 
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cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality" 
and it also points out that "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
necessary medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event 
of unemployment."3 
In an informal talk entitled, “Free Markets for Free Men,” delivered on October 17, 1974, 
before a group of business leaders and others concerned with commodity markets, at a 
luncheon sponsored by the University of Chicago, Milton Friedman lauded the 
achievements of the United States of America saying that; “It’s true that there have been 
free men who have made free markets. The founders of this country, the fathers of our 
Constitution, were free men who believed in individual and personal freedom, and they set 
up a Constitution that was designed to preserve free markets. But many people who 
regarded themselves as free men have produced totalitarian societies. The intellectual 
creators of the Soviet Union would have called themselves free men and would have said 
that they believed in individual and personal freedom. Yet they created not free markets 
but controlled markets.” 4 
He later on explained that it is institutions that actually make free men. “I believe that you 
cannot really say that free men make free markets. They may or may not. But you can say 
with great certainty that free markets make free men and that controlled markets destroy 
free men.” He then elaborated this statement saying, “the tycoons of the 19th century were 
willing to express their opinions on affairs, wherever the chips might fall. The tycoons of 
the 20th century are people who have learned how to get around Washington.”5 
With regard to the free men of the then Union of Soviet Social Republics (Russia) and 
those of the United States of America (USA), Friedman explained the nature of their 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 262 quoting, U.N.G.A. res. 217 A (III), U.N.Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) 
4 Friedman, Milton, Free Markets for Free Men; Selected Papers, No. 45, October, 1974, Graduate School of 
Business, University of Chicago; p 1. 
5 Ibid., p 8 
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differences in the following way; “If they do not seem to be free men, and people in the 
United States do seem to be free men, it’s not because of a difference in their personal 
character or anything like that. It’s because of a difference of the institutions in the two 
countries. The chief difference in the institutions is that we still have some small measure 
of free markets while they have a much lesser measure of free markets.” He crowned this 
part of his speech by letting the audience understand that what “I’m giving you is the 
general argument for free trade that Adam Smith developed two centuries ago”. Friedman 
was so Smithian that he even mimicked the famous Smithian scepticism when he pointed 
to the engaging paradox of mending society - “Well it must be free men who make free 
markets. There’s an element of truth in that, but I think to a far greater extent free markets 
make free men and not the other way around.”6 
Most capitalists seem not to have faith in man’s ability to fashion a ‘good’ society 
although paradoxically they seem most in favour of the unbridled human freedom to elect 
how “to spend your money, what to do with your time, where to work, what job to take, 
where to live.” It smacks of a self-contradictory ‘totalitarian’ system since, at one and the 
same time, one should be utterly free and totally subservient to a free market system 
freely; outside of which there is scepticism of any success in modelling a just human 
society7. George Stigler and Paul Samuelson have pointed out that the principle of 
‘unanimity’ within free markets is of course completely impractical8. History has shown 
that institutions in themselves are not enough to ensure the common good. Personal 
freedom in solidarity is possibly the alternative. 
                                                 
6 Ibid., p 1 
7 George Stigler and Paul Samuelson explain that totalitarianism, especially boarding on inefficiency and 
terrible cruelty is wrong but that neither is there a possibility of efficient decisions when we consider the 
other extreme side of freedom since it is impossible to draw the line where freedom is present or not. Should 
it be 51% or should there be no action if it is not unanimous? Cf. Stigler, G.J. and Samuelson, P., A 
Dialogue on the Proper Economic Role of the State; Selected Paper No. 7, , Graduate School of Business, 
University of Chicago, 1963; Pp 1-40; p 33 
8 Stigler, George .J. and Samuelson, Paul, A Dialogue on the Proper Economic Role of the State; Selected 
Paper No. 7, , Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1963; Pp 1-40; p 32 
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A question then arises from the foregoing, can it "perhaps be said that, after the failure of 
Communism, capitalism is the victorious social system, and that capitalism should be the 
goal for countries now making efforts to rebuild their economy and society?"9 I have tried 
to analyse the nature, place and role of business institutions from the standpoint of the 
Aristotelian – Thomistic concept of the common good. John Paul II made an attempt at 
responding to his own question and mentioned that the answer is complex. “If by 
'capitalism' is meant an economic system which recognizes the fundamental and positive 
role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means 
of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector, then the answer is 
certainly in the affirmative, even though it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak of 
a 'business economy', 'market economy' or simply 'free economy'. But if by 'capitalism' is 
meant a system in which freedom in the economic sector is not circumscribed within a 
strong juridical framework which places it at the service of human freedom in its totality, 
and which sees it as a particular aspect of that freedom, the core of which is ethical and 
religious, then the reply is certainly negative10. 
It is in the nature of human beings and human society to struggle for greater communion, 
culture and material well-being. Social life is necessary for the perfection of the person11. 
The principle motive of human action in society is the common good, which includes the 
personal good. Thus, the good of the person and the social good, or common good, are 
inseparable principles in the life of man. Therefore, the human being acts to attain his own 
perfection and in doing so two aspects are made manifest; the first is that in attaining his 
own perfection he enables the society flourish and secondly, he can only seek his 
perfection best in a flourishing society. To use an analogy of the human body, which is 
multicellular, each cell performs certain processes similar to the human processes for 
eating, breathing, and reproduction. In doing so it contributes to the health of the whole 
                                                 
9 Cassel, Douglas, Human rights and Business Responsibilities in the Global Market Place; Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 2001; P 270; quoting John Paul II, 1991 Encyclical, Centessimus Annus, para. 42 
10 Ibid., p 271 
11 Aquinas, Thomas, S Th II-II, q188, a8 
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body; but similarly, the cell functions best in a healthy body; when all the other cells are 
functioning well. Hence, analogically, the common good of society and the particular good 
of the individual are inseparable. Aquinas’ reiterates this when he says that the common 
good is the end of each individual member of a community, just as the good of the whole 
is the end of each part. On the other hand, the good of one individual is not the end of 
another individual12... and in another place he says that "the good of a nation is more 
divine than the good of one man"13. 
I will use the term common good in the manner in which it is construed in the Aristotelian-
Thomistic tradition. It is generally agreed that the term has its roots in Greek philosophy, 
but that it is Aristotle who uses the terms ‘sumpheron koinon’ – meaning common 
advantage14 and ‘agathon koinon’ translated as common good15. He explains that “the 
good of the polis is [a] greater and more complete good to acquire and preserve”. While 
the personal good of the individual is necessary and incumbent on each person to seek, it 
is finer and more divine to preserve it for a people and for poleis [the plural form of 
polis]”16. Polis in the Aristotelian sense is the city state, such as Athens or Sparta were, in 
which the communities find the greatest happiness in common life. The common good, the 
good of the polis, is thus explained in contrast to the exclusive good of the individual, 
which is inferior. Hence, the common good is "a good proper to, and attainable only by, 
the community, yet individually shared by its members"17.The common good is 
manifested when the core activity (work) of all men and every man is directed to the 
universal good of society and the person, so that the nation-state or ‘polis’ and each part of 
it is flourishing. It remains one while being shared among many. 
                                                 
12 Ibid., S Th II-II, q58, a9 
13 Ibid., S Th I, q108, a6 
14 Aristotle, Ethics, III.6.1278b19-24, "the common advantage also brings them together insofar as they each 
attain the noble life. This is above all the end for all both in common and separately." 
15 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 350 B.C., (Translation, W. D. Ross, 1994), Book XII, 10. 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.html 
16 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b 
17 Smith, Thomas W., Aristotle on the Conditions for and Limits of the Common Good; The American 





The meaning of development is the continuous process of seeking the greater good of 
society and of every person. Authentic human development is that which concerns the 
whole of society and the whole person in every single dimension18. Hence, the common 
good is one of the principles of moral action which comprehends what Benedict XVI 
expounds as “Caritas in Veritate” – Charity in Truth.19 
To grasp this concept is to understand that being a concept that defines a final cause of the 
perfect community; the common good concept has, in various ways, been confounded 
singularly with the political dimension of society. However, as both Aristotle and Aquinas 
show, the fact is that the political common good is not opposed to the good of the person20. 
Secondly, recent heated discussions on the issue (especially in the 1930-40’s) has 
somewhat linked discussion of the common good to acknowledging totalitarian 
government (socialism or its manifestations) as opposed to the liberal or libertarian 
philosophy of life21. Hence, to accept the concept of the common good has meant to accept 
an explicit threat to individual rights and freedoms. It is not the purpose of this paper to 
interpret what liberalist’s philosophy understands by common good. I will use the concept 
in its definition as the good of the whole community and of each member of the 
community. Hence, for me there is no opposition between the whole and the parts with 
regard to the common good as explained above22. 
This essay attempts to show a common good framework that may help revise the manner 
in which the performance of businesses in society is evaluated. It is an attempt at 
encouraging an amplification of the value of the firm, from merely fulfilling its presumed 
                                                 
18 Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter Caritas in Veritate, Para. 11; Librería Editrice Vaticana, 2009 
19 Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, Para. 6; Librería Editrice Vaticana, 2009 
20 Smith, Michael A., Human Dignity and the Common Good in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition; Edwin 
Mellen Press: New York, 1995. P 59 
21 Ibid., p 58 
22 Aristotle, Ethics, III.6.1278b19-24 
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‘contractual’ obligation to derive monetary and material wealth from society, to that of 
seeing itself as an important institution collaborating in the conservation of the common 
good of society in its particular and universal perspective. 
The introductory paragraph offers a bird’s eye view of the state of the question in post-
modern Western Society. It offers the concept of the common good as a basis of finding a 
third way besides capitalism and communism. Chapter 1 sets out to crystallize, locate and 
describe the place and role of institutions – the realm where firms predominate in society – 
on the basis of the Aristotelian-Thomistic social structure. I considered it necessary to go 
back to the foundations of society in order to explain sinuously how the firm is inserted 
into the common good of society. Once inserted into the framework of the common good 
of society, the paragraph then illustrates the positive and negative effects of the firm in 
society based on the current global economic expediency. The diversity of the outcomes 
experienced in society at the altar of capitalist free markets enables us see the negative 
effects more succinctly and in particular the reasons why one needs to think of the so 
called ‘third’ way. In this paper the ‘third’ way is also referred to as an ‘elect’ society. 
At the beginning of Chapter two I discuss the philosophical principles underlying Adam 
Smith’s theory of the ‘wealth of nations’, giving special attention to his ‘Theory of Moral 
Sentiments’. In the ‘Theory of Moral Sentiments’ Adam Smith lays the foundations of 
social morality which should not be separated from his ‘“An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations”. I then offer the response from the Aristotelian-
Thomistic tradition of the theory of the common good. It is also an attempt at showing that 
excellent praxis has as its foundation an implicitly excellent, profound and true theory. 
From the theory of the common good, the last part of chapter 2 gives conclusions which 





My research is fundamentally an interpretative qualitative analysis of the principle of the 
common good in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophies on the one hand, and on the other 
what I could call capitalist philosophic literature. It is an attempt at holistically viewing the 
capitalistic social phenomena and its manifestations while on the other hand offering 
another perspective from the common good theory. It is an advocacy for the common good 
theory as a way of evaluating business institutions. Beside Aristotle’s, ‘Politics’ and 
Aquinas’ ‘Summa Theologica’, I have also considered those who follow similar tenets 
such as Rafael Alvira, Rachel Lázaro, Alejo Sison and Fontrodona, Millán-Puelles, Pope 
John Paul II, Pope Benedict XVI, Alfredo Cruz, Michael Smith, Jacques Maritain, Charles 
de Koninck, Peter Koslowski and Antonio Argandoña among many. On the capitalist 
theory side I have considered Adam Smith, Michael Novak, John Rawls, Isaiah Berlin, 
Manuel Velasquez, Butcher and Clarke among others. It is a grounded theoretical research 
in preparation for further robust qualitative and quantitative research on a new frame work 
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The concept that the diagram tries to portray is taken from Aristotle’s account of how a 
self-sufficing state is naturally created by human tendency towards the common good. 
First, individual human beings combine in pairs because they do not exist apart. The male 
and female join in order to reproduce, and the master and slave come together for self-
preservation. The master uses his intellect to rule, and the slave uses his natural body for 
labour. Second, the households arise naturally in these early communities in order to serve 
everyday needs. Third, when several households develop relationships in order to acquire 
greater natural material goods a village emerges. Finally, “When several villages united in 
a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the polis 
comes into existence. Thus originating from the bare natural needs of life the human 
communities continue in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the early 
forms of society (the family and household) are natural, so is the state, for it is the 
culmination of the natural development of human relationships. Human relationships 
develop out of the necessity of a more perfect life and when this growth reaches self-
sufficiency it is termed the polis (Pltcs, I.2.1252b27-30). Hence, he concludes, “it is 
evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal”24. 
Intermediary institutions ‘implicitly’ appear in his chronology of realizing the city-state 
(polis) when he beginnings to explain commercial associations of men.  
The concept of the circle is used to distinguish the different parts of society, the world and 
the concept of a distinct and ‘complete unit’ of responsibility necessary to achieve the 
common good. The rectangular box which contains the Global society and all its parts is 
the environment in all its reality. It is not finite. The rectangle therefore has the sense of 
the entire Universe and its content. This is mainly to establish the idea of an environment 
in which humankind partakes for human beings do not live in a void. There are animate 
and inanimate creatures and different categories of beings which belong to the entire 
universe and which are necessary for the good of human kind, such as air, water, space, 
time, minerals, planets, plants, material things in all their grandeur. 
                                                 
24 Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, para 2, lines 27-40. 
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The Global society and its different parts are linked and therefore form one circle, but as 
previously alluded to, each circle is a complete whole in itself, and therefore forms a unit 
of the whole; much like cells and organs within the body. These units while distinct are 
part of each other. Hence, the perfection of one affects the others and is part of the others. 
Each complete unit would therefore be imperfect if it existed without the others. 
‘Common’ means that which is prior to us in everything and that unites us as a whole. The 
term ‘particular’ refers to the part in which each person participates within the whole. The 
‘common’ is therefore what each one aspires to and therefore is indispensable although we 
can deny it as a result of our freedom. We aspire naturally to the common good and it is 
greater than us. If we deny it we have no way of adhering to the good25. According to 
Aquinas the term ‘common’ refers to something predicated of something else – an effect 
or some one thing found in many according to one predication (in predicando). It also 
refers to the mode of a cause (in causando) – that is a final cause which remaining one in 
number extends to several effects26. 
Finally, the circles represent elements of society and these develop from the smallest cell 
of society to the larger parts of society. The smallest part is the core or heart of the each 
larger part since it is the principle nature for which all elements of human society find 
their meaning. However, what is not very evident but is assumed in the diagram is that the 
larger parts develop from natural human relationships. The effect of growth in size is 
caused by the processes of effective natural relationships between the smaller parts. 
Hence, the persons27 in the smallest circle form families, for as Aristotle says referring to 
the poet Hesiod, "First house and wife and an ox for the plough"28. 
                                                 
25 Alvira, Rafael D., Bien Común y Justicia Social en las Diferentes Esferas De la Sociedad; Revista 
Empresa Y Humanismo, Vol. XII, No. 2/09, Pp. 61-79, Universidad de Navarra (Pamplona); Abril, 2009 
26 Smith, Michael A., Human Dignity and the Common Good in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition; Edwin 
Mellen Press: New York, 1995. P 80; quoting Aquinas, T., De Veritate 7, 6, ad 7. 
27 Cruz, C.J., Gran Enciclopedia Rialp; Bien común; Ediciones Rialp: Madrid, 1971. P. 224 
28 Aristotle, Politics, 1, part II, Translated by Benjamin Jowett, http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/politics.html 
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The single cell from which society grows is the relationship between man and woman. 
Man and woman unite in marriage and form communities which in turn unite with other 
communities forming a larger political unit. “The family is the association established by 
nature for the supply of a person’s everyday wants… But when several families are united, 
and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society 
to be formed is the village. And the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a 
colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be 
suckled 'with the same milk.' And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally 
governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, 
as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies 
of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same 
blood. Homer says: "Each one gives law to his children and to his wives."29 
Families form villages and villages come together to form the state. At the village level the 
family is still the ‘giver of the law’. At this point necessity for larger communities is 
vaguely left to unity because, all Aristotle says is that, there is a natural process in which 
villages are united in a single complete community; when they are large enough to be 
nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs 
of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life30. Considering contemporary 
society, it is evident that the larger unions made up of many villages are mainly 
augmented through intermarriage among community members or by forming cross-unit 
intermediary institutions to aid in achieving the common good of the individual 
communities31. These include businesses or other economic institutions, political parties, 
and cultural institutions among many others. For inter-community institutions or 
intermediary institutions to form a natural integration of communities, they should have a 
strong foundational basis for communion. 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Koslowski, Peter, “The Common Good of the Firm as the Fiduciary Duty of the Manager”. Pp. 72-75, In 
Global Perspectives on Ethics of Corporate Governance, eds. GJ (Deon) Roussouw and Alejo José G. Sison, 
New York/ Hampshire, England: Palgrave MacMillan. 2006.  
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A strong basis for ‘inter-community’ unions is often provided by a complex of bonds such 
as family bonds, cultural bonds, material necessity bonds, security, and other such bonds, 
which enhance the common good of each individual community32 so that if the bond was 
absent each of the composite communities would be worse off. Each of the bonds or 
complex of bonds is also ultimately supportive of the good of the family33. For instance, 
for the community to desire unity with another community for reasons of security, food 
and drink or maintaining inter - family wealth, it is because the individual will be secured 
or will be able to take care of his or her family or will have more possibilities of 
employment. In Aristotle’s ethics, this concept of bond is maintained by reciprocity in 
exchange. Thus he says that it is by exchange that they [the citizens] hold together34. As 
the communities become larger and form nations and international communities, ties 
between them need to be strong in a way that each individual understands and adheres to.  
The broader the community is, the greater the need for the principle of subsidiarity. The 
effectiveness of these bonds is for the good of the individual and the family. The bond is 
organic rather than static as Antonio Argandoña points out35.  
0.2 Locating the Firm within the Aristotelian Society 
It seems evident that business institutions as such, except merchants, are not considered 
within the politics of Aristotle, they are presumed. This is because businesses are 
institutions that form an important part of the natural tendency of exchange or trade 
between one community and another; between one village and another. The firm is 
necessary as an opportunity for the manager of the household to fend for the necessities of 
his family. If it were not, then the natural process to self-sufficiency that becoming a 
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nation-state provides, thanks to the ‘communion’ through trade between ‘villages’, 
remains rather weak. 
Village needs are well served by business institutions which provide efficacious platforms 
for the relationships that arise among citizens. Businesses form an effective channel for 
self-sufficiency in material goods. They can also be very effective means of transmission 
of knowledge, culture, artefacts and so on, between communities. Secondly, provision for 
self sufficiency, as our contemporary society has shown, is better provided for by 
intermediary institutions in the nature of a firm, rather than individuals acting simply as 
household managers. The firms are intermediaries because they seek resources within and 
beyond the capability of family structures. In this way they contribute to the common good 
of the extended civil society. For example, business in the industrial and post industrial era 
led to the search for resources, to provide raw materials for production; cotton, minerals, 
labour and so on.  
From the foregoing, I conclude that businesses or firms are a means to the common good. 
Their general private nature is also more in line with the nature of the principle of private 
property. For as Aristotle says, ‘It is clearly better that property should be private, but the 
use of it common; and the special business of the legislator is to create in men this 
benevolent disposition’…and again, ‘there is the greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or 
service to friends or guests or companions, which can only be rendered when a man has 
private property. These advantages are lost by excessive [centralisation] of the state. The 
exhibition of two virtues, besides, is visibly annihilated in such a state: first, temperance 
towards women (for it is an honourable action to abstain from another's wife for 
temperance' sake); secondly, liberality in the matter of property.’36 
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Sison and Fontrodona use the word ‘artificial’ or ‘imperfect societies’ to refer to the 
firm37. Accordingly, they suggest that on account of their end or purpose, poleis are 
considered by Aristotle to be “natural” and “perfect” societies, whereas present-day 
corporations by contrast would figure as “artificial” and “imperfect” associations. Like the 
family and the village, the polis is a “natural” society, because it stems from an innate 
tendency in human beings (Politics, 1252b). The firm is artificial, according to them, 
because it does not arise directly or organically from nature and is based on voluntary 
bonds of “friendship” or free association among citizens. Finally, they say that the firm is 
artificial because it is not self sufficient, for the good life. 
 
The last rationale could be applied to families, villages and communities and this would 
make them artificial, yet they are not as already explained. With regard to the rationale 
that they are an ‘imperfect’ association because they do not arise from the innate tendency 
in human beings, it is necessary to point out that Aristotle says that ‘the art of getting 
wealth out of fruits and animals is always natural’38. He further states that there are two 
sorts of wealth-getting…; ‘one is a part of household management, the other is retail trade: 
the former necessary and honourable, while that which consists in exchange is justly 
censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another’. The 
former is honourable because the household manager has to take care of the health needs 
of his family from what nature provides and the latter is artificial because it is a means of 
getting wealth, the most hated sort being ‘usury’39. Aquinas on the other hand explains, in 
reference to Aristotle, that wealth is twofold, natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that 
which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars, 
dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, 
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as money, but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a 
measure of things saleable40. 
The firm in contemporary society is made up of natural parts; viz, knowledge, human 
work, capital, raw materials, it provides for the family necessities, safeguards the just 
relationships between citizens working together, and in general proffers a means to the 
common good of civil society. Therefore, the firm is a type of community. It helps 
augment human relationships and cooperation in friendship and work; greatly enriching 
the family possibilities or the village where the diversity of skills is lower. 
Two aspects of the firm could be delineated in order to understand this institution better. 
One aspect could be the natural relationships of friendship and cooperation and work 
which provide for the needs of the family; and the second being the price or value of 
‘exchange’ that arises from the nature of trading and necessity of ‘capital’. With regard to 
the first aspect, the business is made up of natural elements as stated above. With regard to 
capital and price or value of exchange, the price has to be a just price/value for the art to 
remain a natural exchange of value; otherwise it would be an injustice (an excess over the 
just price) and at times result usury. A value below the just price would be a result of 
ignorance, injustice or charity. In the cases of injustice, Aquinas advocates for retribution 
for the inequality (injustice) perpetrated41. Capital on the other hand is representative of 
work extended to the firm in advance by the owner or bank. Considered from this 
perspective, a firm is an institution made up of natural realities which has the capability of 
making ‘artificial wealth’ (money beyond the natural needs of the subject). Artificial 
wealth could be an unnatural just art or unnatural vice. Money used as a just value for 
work done is equivalent to work itself and this is just. Money, the artificial instrument 
used to represent human work, can itself be misconstrued as a ‘product’ and a thing of 
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exchange delinked from the human work and human needs that give it its genuine ‘value’. 
For example, in the ‘mercantilist’42 money is the beginning and end of business. 
The firm or business is ‘artificial’ from two perspectives; first it is the effect of a form in 
the mind of the entrepreneur (man), rather than a ‘being’ arising out of a natural organic 
process given by the one who Creates out of nothing as explained by Aquinas; ‘natural 
things depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human.’43 And secondly, it 
can create ‘artificial wealth’. Sison and Fontrodona explain that business firms and 
corporations are intermediate bodies that primarily pursue economic goals44. Natural 
chrematistics are for the provision of “such things necessary to life and useful for the 
community of the family or state, as can be stored”45, whereas non-natural chrematistics, 
of “riches and property [which] have no limit”. Natural wealth-getting is based on the 
premise that true riches, kind and amount of property needed for a good life has a limit. 
Non-natural wealth-getting, on the other hand, believes that “more is always better”. 
Hence, with regard to money used for exchange Aristotle concludes that money was 
intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term interest, 
which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because 
the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of [the many] modes of getting wealth this 
is the most unnatural46. It can be surmised here that unbridled augmentation of riches is 
contrary to nature whereas, wealth for the purpose of providing for the community is 
natural. What seems very upright in Aristotle is the concept of unfair means of acquiring 
wealth and the excess of wealth beyond the needs of the family and by extension, the 
community. Finally, one can also surmise that the measure of wealth is the ‘need’ of a 
flourishing family and by extension, community. Since this is most difficult to measure, as 
every family and community can allocate itself unnatural needs and needs are relative, 
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then it is necessary to find a way to measure and regulate the business in a way that helps 
it acquire the virtue of finding the ‘just mean’ in wealth accumulation. 
0.3 Natural and Artificial Elements of the Firm 
The firm therefore has both natural and artificial elements according to the Aristotelian 
and Thomistic understanding of the concepts. The natural element is the role of providing 
for the necessities of the household for a good or flourishing life. The artificial is the 
chrematistic tendency of accumulating undue ‘profit’ or construing the business as merely 
a tool for the accumulation of riches. Business is not self-sufficient from the perspective of 
the common good, but in consequence, one cannot construe that the business is an 
unnatural vice of man, since all societies other than the polis (the self-sufficing nation-
state) would be ‘imperfect’ from that perspective. Secondly, since the manager of the 
household has a natural right to provide food and material-being for the needs of his 
family, then any noble and natural way he uses to make that provision is excellent for the 
attainment of the common good. And finally, the real vice in the firm is the ‘end’ or 
‘object’ per se of making profit outside the provision the needs of society in order to 
flourish. Other vices may be construed of the firm such as unjust wages, unjust prices, 
exploitation of people and natural resources and the like. But the ultimate root of these 
vices is primarily the one vice of ‘excessive’ profits; wealth for the sake of wealth. 
A complex question arises given that any art or work to provide material necessity may 
result in surplus produce, whether food, or drink or clothing or anything for that matter 
that is construed as a need for the family. The surplus may again be traded for the needs 
that the family does not have or for the sake of another family in need of the surplus. I 
propose that this is still within the ambit of natural social life and a natural necessity for 
the common good of the universal society. There remains therefore, the argument of 
savings of the family. 
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The question is whether savings are a natural need for the family? The answer is yes, for it 
is natural to put aside food or family material needs to be used in case of drought or other 
unforeseen natural disasters or simply to take care of the needs of the family in the future. 
Therefore, one sees that in seeking provision for the family, the natural consequences of 
this work are material provision for the needs of the family and reasonable savings for the 
future. In economics this can be construed as value of work = salary (for a flourishing life) 
+ savings. Anything beyond this can be construed as ‘unnatural profit’. 
Further, unnatural profit is equivalent to a luxury. That is, any material well-being in 
excess of the natural needs of the family or the excess over and above food, clothing, 
education and research and development, housing, travelling, light, water, health and the 
like and savings. For natural material needs of the family and the so called ‘luxuries’’; the 
true measure of ‘excess’ is in not in quantity, since needs as such cannot be quantified and 
are relative to the context. Rather, the measure of the material needs now and future 
savings are in human virtues. If there is truly an excess then as Aquinas suggests, this can 
be used for a good purpose, for the good of others. A man may intend the moderate gain 
which he seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his household, or for the assistance 
of the needy: or again, a man may take to trade for some public advantage, for instance, 
lest his country lack the necessaries of life, and seek gain, not as an end, but as payment 
for his labour47. In the case of a communities aggregate wealth or riches or the limit at 
which a society, as a whole, is living a luxurious life, the measure is justice and charity, 
seen from the perspective of the level of wealth of each citizen and the whole people. The 
terms personal virtue and social virtue are used here to comprehend all the good human 
qualities that enable a person in a society persist in his pursuit of the good. 
The primary virtue is that which will measure between excess and what is just. From the 
perspective of society, the virtue which serves this role is justice in its fullest and widest 
scope. From the point of view of the person as such it is temperance. As Aquinas explains, 
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“Human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with 
reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its very name 
implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes. Therefore 
temperance is a virtue… Further, that nature inclines everything to whatever is 
becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to 
him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that those 
pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with reason. From such 
pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but from those which are contrary 
to reason. Wherefore it is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination 
of human nature, but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the 
inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason”48. 
With regard to Justice, Aquinas states, 
“Justice… directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in 
two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his 
relations with others in general, in so far as a man, who serves a community, 
serves all those who are included in that community. Accordingly justice in its 
proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. Now it is 
evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation to that 
community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that 
whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It 
follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in 
relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable 
to the common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can 
pertain to justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this 
sense that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to 
direct to the common good … it follows that the justice which is in this way 
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styled general, is called "legal justice," because thereby man is in harmony with 
the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good”49. 
Justice is needed both in the person and in the society. It is Aquinas, who explains that, 
“There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, 
as in buying and selling, and other kinds of intercourse and exchange. This, the 
Philosopher [Aristotle, Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, that directs 
exchange and intercourse of business. The other consists in distribution, and is 
called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his 
rank deserves."50 
0.4 Synthesis 
From my literature research it emerges that for man, from the ‘dawn’ of his being, is 
naturally born into a society, into a family, and is therefore a social being by nature; and a 
social life is necessary for the practice of perfection51. Aristotle has shown that the 
primordial social cell of man’s society is the family. Man freely develops his family into a 
household. He is born with free-will because by the gift of nature, all his deliberate actions 
stem from his judgments. Aquinas says, a sheep upon seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to 
be shunned from natural instinct; but man acts from judgment, because by his 
apprehensive power (from some act of comparison in the reason) he judges that something 
should be avoided or sought. Therefore, he acts from free judgment and retains the power 
of being inclined to various things52. Freedom is the means or the core instrument that man 
uses to establish a flourishing society, for outside society, that is, man in solitude, freedom 
is reduced to the level of mere instinct as that of animal. 
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Secondly, for Aristotle, male and female are joined in order to reproduce – paternity; and 
the master and slave came together for self-preservation. With the rule of the intellect man 
works for self-preservation, propagation of his species and education of his family. “When 
several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or 
quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the natural needs of life, 
and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. 
The bonds that link one village to another and one community to another are primarily 
carried out by institutions developed between them. A security force is therefore 
institutionalised in the armed forces; intercommunity educational and cultural exchange is 
institutionalised in schools and colleges and universities and cultural institutions; trade and 
technology to provide for larger community needs through exploiting more complex 
natural resources is institutionalised in private businesses, public institutions and 
technological institutions whether public or private. The exchange that ensues between 
village and village and family and family and community and community is the institution 
that uses ‘money’ as the equitable measure of value. 
 
My understanding is that it is in the nature of institutions to find their perfection of ends 
and means in the political institution of the polis or the nation-state. The term institution is 
here defined as ‘an organization founded and united for a specific purpose’53. It may also 
be seen more specifically as individual concrete social organization such as a family, a 
business, a club, a parish or a state among others54. In Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ 
understanding of the political institution; wherever many things are directed to one, we 
shall always find one at the head directing them and secondly, if one man surpassed 
another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts 
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conduced to the benefit of others55. This obviously implies, that the perfection to which 
the institutions adhere, so do the individuals and families, for the common good is the 
good of the whole and the parts. 
The business or the firm is one of the institutions that forms the nexus between the village 
(or community) and the nation-state. It has been shown, from the literature available and 
from Aristotle and Aquinas that the business as an institution is a creation of man and thus 
‘artificial’ as opposed to ‘natural’, and that it comprehends or is a composition of both 
‘artificial’ and ‘natural’ elements. Natural because it is formed by and for the sake of 
knowledge, human work, capital, raw materials, provides for the family necessities, 
safeguards the just relationships between citizens working together, and in general proffers 
a means to the common good of civil society. Given all these natural capabilities of the 
firm, it becomes clear that the institution is an excellent means to an abundance of material 
possessions and resources56 of the family and society; for such is the definition of the 
world wealth. I have defined artificial wealth as the ‘wealth’ which is beyond the natural 
needs (wealth) of the family and the polis and therefore is not based on true wealth. In as 
much as a firm is composed of human relations and work; it is also a nexus of societal 
transcendental goods, both internal and external, such as, habitat, civilization, culture and 
education. 
Finally, the role of the highest societal institution and the family members is to ensure that 
there is tranquillity in order (peace) in society, through justice. Human needs and wants 
find their optimum perfection in virtue and not in the material goods. Man generally has 
an infinite appetite, an infinite instinctive capacity for material goods. External goods 
include ‘good birth (eugeneia), education, wealth and material goods, workers, political 
power, honour, leisure, friends, and one’s own children. If one is to cultivate the virtues 
and enjoy a good life, one requires more external goods than are necessary to merely 
sustain life. They are necessary for a good life but are not sufficient. Internal goods are 
                                                 
55 Aquinas, Thomas, S Th I, q96, a4 
56 WordNet®, Princeton university lexical database; http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=wealth 
29 
 
those excellences of intellect and character (NE, II, 1), that are internal to psyche and 
activity of some actor57. Aristotle adds an intermediate category between internal and 
external goods comprising of ‘goods of the body’, health, beauty, and strength; but 
sometimes he considers these as external goods since they are external to the human 
psyche and energia58.  They are necessary to produce (NE 1096b, 11) because they 
preserve and protect internal goods. They are instrumental, and therefore their measure is 
the good specific and internal to human beings and their activity59. In conclusion, 
“Material well-being signifies, in as much as we are refereeing to the subject (subjectively 
speaking), ‘the self-expression of the human spirit in its bodily nature”60. 
Perspectives on the Concept of the Common Good and Firms 
0.5 The State, the Ontological and Practical Common Good 
There is a difficulty in capturing the concept of the common good as most authors allude 
to61. This is because the societal common good is a state of ‘flourishing’ or ‘self-
sufficiency’ in which human beings as persons and society as a whole are enjoying the 
fruit of their labour (cultural and material well being) and are living in harmony with one 
another (peace) as Millán-Puelles (1971)62 puts it. Therefore, the state of well being and 
peace in society is not only manifested by material well-being, but also by cultural well-
being which is something that belongs to the spiritual realm and is not quantifiable as 
such. Nevertheless it is a reality. For instance, one may be enjoying the same life style in a 
society, but in a rather impersonal and disconnected manner. From another perspective, 
when one may enjoy material well-being (riches) and tend towards self-alienation or 
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distance from others. Hence, matter cannot enjoin society; only something more spiritual 
which we often refer to as love or friendliness. It is what Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas 
and the Scholastics refer to as virtue, which is primarily a spiritual phenomenon. Hence, 
for human beings to enjoy society they need to be bound by both material and spiritual 
aspects. 
0.6 The Common Good and the Person and Society 
Millán-Puelles explains the concept of the common good as both ontological and practical. 
From the scholastic perspective, the Common Good is ultimately discussed from two 
perspectives; the “ontological” perspective and the social perspective. The ontological 
common good is the appropriate good in which every person in the community aspires to. 
From the social perspective properly speaking, the common good is that which benefits 
every person in the society or community of persons63. Both the ontological and practical 
social perspectives are difficult to point to or to be very specific about primarily because 
the common good is primarily achieved through good actions or virtues of people. 
Alvira (2009)64 adheres to this definition of the common good and takes it further. He 
doubts whether it is appropriate to say that the society is for the person rather than 
consider it the other way round. To be a ‘person’ exceeds mere individuality. However, 
that the society is for the person and not the person for society is a thesis which appears 
true in intention but very difficult to elucidate. Since really there is no ‘particular’ good 
without the common good and since the common good is necessarily societal. He even 
makes the strong statement that “humanism is above all belonging to society” and 
therefore to become human for him is to rise above our individuality65. Hence, at all times 
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one is either struggling to develop the society or destroying it; humanity is received from 
society66. 
Alejo Sison sees the common good as Aristotle did; eudaimonia (happiness) consists in a 
good life in common, shared with one’s family, friends and fellow-citizens in the polis. 
Not only is this the supreme human good but it is also the common good67; that which is 
apt for each and everyone in society. However it is essential to note that the common good 
is not common because everyone in a society participates in it, but rather it is common 
because in itself it can be allocated to all people in a society68. Therefore, with regard to 
the firm, the current perception has no place for the concept of the common good because 
in the shareholder view, there is a common business end, profit; but it is not the kind of 
good in which each and everyone can actually participate. With regard to the stakeholder 
theory, the distribution of profits, there is only a common instrumentality of the firm put at 
the service of divergent or rival interests. The different stakeholders simply use the firm to 
further their own exclusive interests. He and Joan Fontrodona conclude that, a theory of 
the firm based on the common good would require three conditions. Firstly, it should 
provide an account of the proper locus and purpose of the firm within the overall context 
of society, the integral whole, where the intrinsic, social and practical common good of 
human beings is primarily to be found. Secondly, it should put forward an explanation of a 
common good proper to the firm itself as a whole and to each of its constituents. Thirdly, 
it should propose ways in which the particular common good of the firm could be 
integrated or subordinated to the wider common good of the political community69. 
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Robert G Kennedy has a similar perception to Sison’s; that is, that when one refers to the 
common good he is referring to a good that is shared among the citizens70. Hence, Sison 
explains that Kennedy understands the term common good as referring to the contributions 
of the firm to the common good, such as augmenting the wealth-producing capacity of 
society and offering better goods and services to address our material needs, but never of 
the common good of the firm per se71. Of those who agree to the idea that the common 
good is "a good proper to, and attainable only by, the community, yet individually shared 
by its members" are Mary M. Keys72, Thomas Smith (1999)73 and Dupre74 as expounded 
by Thomas Smith. 
Mary Keys much like Sison is not in agreement with John Rawls, Sandel and Galston’s 
concept of the common good. In Daniel Schwartz’s review of Keys it is mentioned that; 
Rawls views the common good as constituted by arbitrary utilitarian desires and 
arrangements of players in the free market place; Sandel’s common good is the good of a 
community, but is relative given the lack of a universal good or solid foundation of the 
good. He has been labelled communitarian but has yet to accept the label; Galston on the 
other hand follows Isaiah Berlins value pluralism which gives political action the benefit 
of doubt, much like Thomas Hobbes does. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Berlin 
does not share Hobbes’ pessimism on human society75. 
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Manuel Velasquez, Claire Andre, Thomas Shanks, and Michael J. Meyer, seem to agree 
with John Rawls perception of the common good. They see it as a good which everyone 
enjoys, which is "certain general conditions that are...equally to everyone's advantage"76. 
This common good is made up of the general goods the citizens can enjoy in society such 
as water, environmental assets, healthcare and so on. In addition the common good is not 
objective but rather an agreement between citizens in a democratic state. This school of 
thought, much like most liberalist pose, sees the common good as problematic since, in a 
pluralistic society there are differing perceptions of what the common good is and 
therefore it is difficult to achieve through a democratic process. Secondly, there are people 
who will always act badly and contrary to the common good since this is a reality of 
society; that there are bad people. Thirdly, individualism poses an obstacle to the common 
good since it places a high value on individual freedom, on personal rights, and on 
allowing each person to "do his or her own thing". Most of all, it seems that the common 
good often requires particular individuals or particular groups to bear costs that are much 
greater than those borne by others. For example, in order to make the health system 
affordable and accessible to all, it may require that insurers accept lower premiums, that 
physicians accept lower salaries, or that those with particularly costly diseases or 
conditions forego the medical treatment on which their life depends on77. 
Individual perceptions are relevant if based on the principle of questioning reality in order 
to reach decisions, actions and means in the truth, which is ‘the principal driving force 
behind the authentic development of every person and of all humanity’.78 No one has the 
perfect solution to everything. Precisely, this is one of the reasons human beings need each 
another; because one solves problems better when one deliberates among many divergent 
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points of view. But the ultimate goal is to reach decisions that accomplish the good of all 
and everyone. Otherwise divergence becomes a divisive force and a path contrary to good 
ordering of society and therefore peace. It can also lead to a state of anarchy. Secondly, if 
individuals in society live contrary to virtue, that is, they are vicious, then the foundations 
of vice must be in the lack of proper education and lack of justice in society. But vice 
cannot be the basis of organising society. It should be virtue, for that is the highest good of 
the individual and the community. It follows therefore that the society must find a solution 
against the vices and prevail upon them. If not, then the ideal of moral action is lost. The 
consequences of that would be grief in society and not happiness both in the short and 
long-run. Thirdly, the good of the individual is lower or less perfect than that of the 
common good of the whole community; as Aristotle explains, the sufficiency of 
happiness, and therefore the good, is not conceivable in a strictly individual perspective. In 
order to be complete happiness must extend to one’s, spouse, children, relatives and fellow 
citizens79. In conclusion, those who suffer for the sake of the common good do so for the 
sake of the common good; for the good of the whole is also the good of the parts in the 
long-run, and breeds peace. Aquinas expounds the idea by saying that the good to which 
the city is ordered is the highest among human goods, for the proportion of things which 
are means to an end must be according to the proportion of ends80. 
What obviously catches the eye is that democracy is mostly embroiled in the task of 
finding the majority in any set of decisions to be made, starting from selecting the leader 
of a state. But this also is required of executives in firms; to make inclusive decision 
making especially through the principle of subsidiarity. As Butcher and Clarke show, 
business leaders need to be responsive to the external interests of shareholders, customers, 
supply chain relationships and strategic alliances, as well as to… employees seeking 
greater “voice” and consultation. To quote them, this multiple interest perspective has 
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served to promote the development of stakeholder theory in which business success is seen 
to lie in the capability of organizations to effectively work with, and accommodate, such 
diverse concerns (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson, 1999; Jones, 1999). The participation of 
such stakeholders in organizational governance suggests a more democratic orientation to 
organizing (Harrison and Freeman, 2004)81. The reason why the democratic system can be 
used for one set of decisions and not for another requires study. The only distinguishing 
thing, as I see it, between the democratic process of electing a president and that of 
choosing which health care system to use is that the latter affects the unbridled capitalism 
of a particular group of people in society. It is assumed that in electing a president that 
would not happen since apparently the ‘institution of the presidency’ will ensure the 
freedom of all and none interference with the market system. There seems therefore to be 
a contradiction in practice and theory, regarding this premise. 
Terchek, Ronald J. and Moore, David K, critique Michael Smith on his exposition of the 
Aristotelian common good.  They claim that Aristotle is pessimistic about attaining the 
"common good" because it seems that justice, equality, and the ends of politics (happiness 
of citizens) necessarily resist the possibility of a common good in any city82 (NE 1096b30-
5, 1097a8-14). But this is explained by Aristotle in NE 1097a, 15-1098b, 7), that the good 
is a principle not a form. It is not a thing but an end. The human good is activity expressed 
in virtue, and if there are more than one virtue the good will express the best and most 
complete virtue83. There is a clear difficulty in differentiating the perfect state to which 
man desires, the common good, and the processes in which man finds himself, and which 
naturally seems difficult to explain in virtue of the ultimate end of society or of the person. 
Needless to say, one may find it difficult to reach the good, but the one thing that must be 
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fostered is the desire to keep trying, both at the individual level and at the level of 
governance of human society. 
Though the common good is difficult to achieve one cannot settle on the ‘middle path’ of 
imperfection. Apparently this ‘middle path’ has manifested itself, in global terms, in 
accessing totalitarianism, capitalism or communism.   In trying to find the ‘just mean’ of 
an imperfect political life, many seek a state of affairs, which Novak refers to as, the 
success of democracy, liberalism, and market economies, where man glories in 
“divergence, dissent, and singularity” and invents “practical principles embodied in 
institutions… jealously guarded by rival interests, each of considerable power, by which 
social cooperation may be achieved without prior agreement on metaphysical, 
philosophical, or religious presuppositions’84. This state of social affairs, of the state of 
‘cooperating individuals’ for the good of either part, is supposed to achieve the common 
advantage of social cooperation, peace, thanks to an ‘invisible hand”. But one cannot 
jealously guard lies, injustice, or any other vice for the sake of social cooperation. Social 
cooperation is meant to be the ultimate good of a political community, based on 
cooperation in Truth. The search for truth on the other hand demands the study of 
metaphysical, philosophical and religious truths. 
However, not all liberals are of the same stripe – it is not a unified theory. For example, 
Novak is a Christian liberal democrat while Tercheck and Moore seem to be liberals who 
perceive that politics is not to be linked with ethics85. Ethics makes societal life rather easy 
to comprehend and avoids the hard things that politics causes, and the struggle for power. 
Whereas Terchek deny that the simplicity of ethics is, to be sure naïve, they prefer a 
contradictory stand in relation to Aristotle. Whatever the reasoning may be, it is not that of 
Aristotle, who in the ‘Politics’ shows a persistent attentiveness to a world of inequality and 
power and who asks individuals to learn to share a time and place in ways that respect 
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political expediency. Aristotle’s politics of civic friendship should be read hand in hand 
with his call for citizens to fight for political autonomy in a political cosmos that can also 
challenge the centrifugal forces inherent in any society86. 
As previously alluded to, Butcher and Clarke research the democratic organization. In 
their findings they propose three particular mechanisms for democracy to work in any 
organization. The first is a process of representation that balances potential tyranny and 
Anarchy, achieving decisions through democratic debate (Barbrook, 1975)87. The second 
is accountability, which allows members to have power to “punish” or “reward” leaders 
through elections (Barry, 2002)88. Thirdly, a participation process should be put in place to 
take into account the electorate’s views (Kaiser et al., 2002)89. Kim et al. (2002)90 suggest 
that the degree of electoral inclusion has a direct impact on the level of trust. Their 
conclusion is that the process of changing organizations to real democratic institutions is 
still a matter of debate. They also conclude that, in much of the management literature, 
organizations are still considered as communities of stakeholders. For instance, Charles 
Handy (1997, 1998) tracks the emergence of the concept of “organizational citizenship”. 
Handy’s idea reflects the voluntary basis upon which employees share their valuable 
knowledge; this has to be given freely and thus employees need to be viewed as voluntary 
citizens, not merely employees91. Although this work does not explicitly deal with the 
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concept of the common good as such, it deals with the organization as a community of 
stakeholders. The Stakeholder theory is are a modern way of inserting business 
organizations within society’s common good. For instance, Butcher and Clarke’s conclude 
that there is always a ‘common end’ to which business decisions drive towards. The 
principle of democratic leadership promotes and legitimizes both the distribution and 
coalescing of power and the necessary dissent and debate required to reconcile a plurality 
of interests with the establishment of organizational coherence... Common good can 
emerge “from chaotic, reciprocal interaction among people with potentially conflicting 
goals, values and ideals” (Barker, 1997, p. 351)92. 
Isaiah Berlin saw the common good in a negative perspective. He saw the common good 
associated with theocratic and egalitarian society. He rejects the government imposing a 
specific vision of the common good. George Crowder, another ‘Berliner’, perceives the 
Common Good purely as a ‘liberal political framework’93. Yet, allowing the government 
on the one hand or allowing the democratic liberal system on the other would still leave us 
on the same spot given Immanuel Kant’s words, that ¨out of timber so crooked as that of 
which man is made nothing entirely straight can be built¨94. Sometimes the common good 
is simply exchanged for social responsibility or the social good, by which term most refer 
to the wealth maximization at the benefit of the firm. Epstein95 and Koslowski96 tend 
towards this perspective.  
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In section 2 it is noted that the concept of the common good has its etymology in the 
works of the Greek philosophers, especially that of Aristotle. This philosopher used two 
terms to refer almost to the same thing: sumpheron koinon and Agathon Koinon, translated 
as ‘common advantage’ and ‘common good’ respectively97. The term has been mainly 
used by Christian philosophers but is now gaining common usage in contemporary 
philosophy. Common good is the ultimate good, the ontological good and also the highest 
practical social good according to Millán-Puelles. As ontological the common good is God 
and as an ultimate practical social common good it is the state of flourishing or self- 
sufficiency in a state which results in happiness of the citizens and in the state. One 
observes that for the individual in society, the good life and therefore happiness 
presupposes life in common. The good life found in the polis is communicated to each and 
helps each one flourish. 
The common good is found when there is tranquillity in order (peace) and it also foresees 
a dynamic state of cultural and material well-being (Millán-Puelles, 1971). However, 
caution has been made with regard to those who see in the common good the flourishing 
of material well being only or simply see it as a nexus of happy individuals each somehow 
‘alienated in his or her individualism from the others. Likewise, to apply the term common 
good to institutions is suspect, for historically the term applies to the polis or nation state 
as the highest or optimum state of a society.  
Finally, one could conclude that the common good rests in virtue or the spiritual good for 
there is no repose in the material goods. As Aquinas explains, the desire for natural 
(spiritual and material together) riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a 
certain measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of 
disordered concupiscence and this is because, we realize more their insufficiency when we 
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possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good 
does not consist therein98. The firm as an institution towards the perfective polis or state 
has to adhere to these principles as if to ensure that its objective respects and seeks the 
common good as described. It is therefore wrong for the firm to merely see its end in 
‘artificial wealth’ or ‘profit’. The retrogression of society as a result of seeking profit for 
the sake of profit has had its evil effects in society as we shall now see. 
Diverse Outcomes on the Path to the Common Good 
0.9 Development towards the Common Good 
With significant hind sight it is reasonable to say that man’s progress in search of the 
common good has been tremendous. From a savage alienated global human society in the 
past, whether in the eastern or western hemisphere of the globe, we can almost say that we 
live in a globalised society99. Development in any part of the world is transmitted to other 
parts of the world relatively quickly. The means of communication have advanced 
phenomenally. There are considerably fast means of air transportation, sea transport and 
the effective capacity to transmit information.  Human culture has developed to the extent 
that every human being throughout the world is capable of education in virtue, going to 
school, of feeding himself, of living in decent housing, of leaving a healthy life, of 
availing to themselves the gift of technology and so many other cultural goods.  We have 
technologically elaborated the means to effective dialogue among cultures. The 
wherewithal to organize a sustainable universal society is available. In general, these great 
human achievements, though capable of permeating every sector of this globe, are still 
denied millions of people. Parallel to this abundance, we see the indignity of basic 
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material impoverishment of millions of people and likewise the spiritual alienation of 
individuals in society. This in essence is the loss of human dignity100. 
0.10 The Paradox of Cultural Development 
Very often one finds that there is a battle between human dignity founded on cultural 
norms and material well-being. In the ensuing search for prioritization there may be a 
tendency to consider them as mutually exclusive101. Culture includes all the norms and 
customs that enhance our certainty of human dignity; Religion, ethics, history and 
traditions, education, philosophy, cultural values, art, artefacts, and entertainment. Alejo 
Sison defines cultural values as including a broad variety of technical, artistic, intellectual, 
ethical and spiritual goods102. Benedict XVI, makes reference to this paradoxical situation 
when he says, that “we are living in a time of great dangers and great opportunities for 
man and the world; a time which is also of great responsibility for us all. During the past 
century man's possibilities and his dominion over resources grew by truly unthinkable 
measures. However, his power to dispose of the world’s resources has been such as to 
allow his capacity for destruction to reach dimensions which at times horrify us. In this 
connection, the threat of terrorism comes spontaneously to mind, this new war without 
boundaries or fronts.103  
An important reality slowly taking shape in western culture is that despite the great 
material-technological advancement, man, especially in Europe, is bent on excluding the 
Christian religion from the public conscience104. Religion has been all but consigned to the 
individual sphere as a result of the philosophy of individualism. Not only is man eager to 
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store God in the ‘archive of human history’ but given genetic science man is now almost 
able “reconstruct human life”105. This possibility has engendered in man the conviction 
that he is master of himself which seems to have overshadowed the other conviction that 
he is the splendorous ‘image of God’. Ratzinger surmises that in Europe a culture has 
developed that constitutes the absolutely most radical contradiction not only of 
Christianity, but of the religious and moral traditions of humanity106. The contradiction 
lays mainly in the paradoxical growth of human technology on the one hand and on the 
other an ever increasing ‘alienation’ of man from his inherent dignity as observed above. 
This paradoxical state of affairs seems to have permeated human institutions which man 
has engendered to help him improve his material, social-cultural and political life. The 
person as an individual and the person within institutions have the responsibility of 
improving this untenable situation. In order to do this one needs to examine the obstacles. 
0.11 Institutionalizing Democracy and Free markets 
A key development in human society has been the institutionalization of democracy in 
many nation states. Democracy could be defined as the “institutionalization of citizen’s 
participation in political organization and governance through permanent 
intercommunication or dialogue between those who govern and those governed”107. 
Between 1975 and 2002 there was a quadrupling in the number of democratic countries108. 
Regarding International trade Eichengreen and Leblang were measuring trade openness 
(as imports plus exports as a percentage of gross domestic product), they found out that 
countries for which comparable data on international trade exist began with 14 in 1870, 
doubled by the end of World War I (to 28), doubled again by the end of World War II (to 
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56) and reached a maximum of 156 by 1998’109. Their research augments the idea that 
‘trade and financial openness continue to affect democracy positively, while democracy 
continues to affect both trade and financial openness positively’110 
Unethical Behaviour in Firms and their Effect on Society 
0.12 The Changing Role and Definition of the Firm in Society 
Rafael Alvira’s definition of the concept of ‘institution’, in its widest scope, is a 
concretized and distinct social organization; such as a family, a business, a club, a parish 
or a state among others111. One of the institutions is the business or the firm, which Sison, 
refers to as a nexus of contracts between principals, contributing capital, and agents, 
contributing labour, for the purpose of producing goods and services112. However, the firm 
or the business institution has over time come to be defined merely from its profit 
objective. Hence, it is not surprising that Sison perceives that, currently, most people 
define the firm’s singular objective as that of creating “profit through efficient production 
and to distribute this profit among all interested parties; although the capital providers or 
shareholders have a priority, in accordance with agreed upon corporate governance 
mechanisms.”113 He points out nevertheless that human society is slowly gaining a new 
conception of the firm as ‘the coming together of various interest groups or stakeholders 
beyond capital and labour’114.  
The firm (the term often used to describe business institutions) as I have argued in 
paragraph 1.2, has both natural and artificial elements. They are formed as a result of 
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chance, contractual relationships or rational ends such as a company, factory workers and 
so on115. Unlike Max Scheler, I do not think that the society is necessarily built on the 
decadence and decomposition of a community. Societies can in fact augment the bond of a 
community if formed properly. For instance, the employees of a business enterprise will 
take care of the well being of their families largely because they earn a salary; besides, 
working within a society, such as a company, can be a channel of contributing and serving 
to the community. A society, such as a firm, is not self-sufficing or flourishing. The 
flourishing life for Aristotle depends on the wholesome community of families, other 
groups and the polis. Rather, like other intermediate bodies, the society’s purpose is to 
supply some of the necessary means for the good life (Pltcs 1280b). Business firms and 
corporations are intermediate bodies that primarily pursue economic goals. In this case, 
the management’s main objective is no longer to maximize profits but to balance, or 
optimize profits, for each of the stakeholder groups: investment returns for shareholders, 
salaries for workers, goods and services for consumers, taxes for the government and so 
forth. In practice, these groups often have conflicting interests116. There is growing 
concern therefore that the objective of the firm is not merely doing business so well as to 
maximize profits. As an example, De Bettingnies and Lepineux, refer to the “common 
good” as a primary objective of firms over the last four decades of the twentieth century 
and into the twenty first century. However, their concept of the common good is merely 
one that encompasses the concept of the “triple bottom line”. The three-dimensional 
approach—economic, social, and environmental—lies at the basis of the sustainable 
development notion popularized by the Brundtland Report in 1987, of the "Triple Bottom 
Line" concept, and of the "Triple P" (People, Planet, and Profit) policy adopted by some 
leading companies117. It will suffice here to surmise that the changes in perception of what 
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a firm’s objective is have come about because of far reaching scandals perpetrated by 
firms. 
0.13 The Impact of Firms in Contemporary Society 
Institutions have always been crucial to the economic development of nations. Bettignies 
and Lepineux, demonstrate this idea by showing that in 2009, many international firms 
grew larger in size than many nations. Their research shows that according to World Bank 
statistics half of the hundred biggest economies in the world are now corporations, the rest 
being nation-states. For example, they show that the sales proceeds of Shell ($268.9 
billion) and the gross domestic product of Niger ($2.7 billion) in 2003 is especially 
interesting in this respect, as the former is a hundred times greater than the latter; so too is 
the comparison between the net sales of General Motors ($185.5 billion) and the GDP of 
Botswana ($7.4 billion) in 2003—the ratio in that case is 25 to 1. One could also compare 
the turnover of Johnson & Johnson ($41.9 billion) and the gross domestic product of 
Kazakhstan ($29.7 billion) that same year or the turnover of Microsoft ($32.2 billion) and 
the GDP of Guatemala ($24.7 billion), still in 2003118. Corporations have become leading 
players in contemporary society; indeed, they can legitimately be considered as the central 
value-creation institutions of our time.119 The effect of this is that for some time now 
corporations are negotiating and demanding concessions at the level of “nation-states”. It 
is now obvious that nation-states on the other hand wouldn’t have the financial power to 
afford strong negotiating positions. As our authors explain, the large firms can negotiate 
national regulations, when they deem them too constraining, by transferring their profits to 
low tax countries and their operations to lower labour cost environments.  It goes without 
saying that governments would be hard put, for the same reasons, to regulate the large 
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multi-national firms. One can then understand the danger paused by multinational firms 
who have profit as their only motive. It would literally mean that a vast number of nation-
states, or for that matter, human society in general is at the behest of “profit” interests of 
firms. 
0.14 Universal Economic Inequality 
Probably the greatest effect of this ‘capitalistic’ system is the resultant inequality among 
nations and peoples as a result of ‘selfish’ economic principles. The Bruntland report 
mentioned above provides some data120. It mentions that there are more hungry people in 
the world today than ever before in human history, and their numbers are growing. In 
1980, there were 340 million people in 87 developing countries not getting enough 
calories to prevent stunted growth and serious health risks. This total was very slightly 
below the figure for 1970 in terms of share of the world population, but in terms of sheer 
numbers, it represented a 14 per cent increase. The World Bank predicts that these 
numbers are likely to go on growing. It also mentions that people living in slums and 
shanty towns are rising and that many cannot access clean water and sanitation and is prey 
to diseases121. In 2008, the gross national income per capita data (see table 1 below) 
demonstrated that the average gross national income per capita (GNIPC) is sixteen times 
that of the lowest GNIPC. On the other hand the highest GNIPC, according to the World 
Bank statistics in 2008, was approximately 4.5 times more than the average GNIPC. That 
data illustrates, in effect, that the in the lowest GNIPC countries the people were living at 
an average of USD $1.4 per day while those in the highest GNIPC countries were living at 
an average of USD $107.7 per day. From a productivity perspective that means that the 
average person in a low income country is worth USD $1 per day while the one in a high 
income country is worth USD $107 per day. 
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Table 1: World Gross National Income Per Capita 
Gross national income per capita (GNIPC) 2008, Atlas method and PPP 
Population 
In thousands % age 
 Atlas method  
Purchasing 
power parity 
Economy  (US dollars)  Economy  
(international 
dollars)  
World  8,579 World  10,357  6,692,062 100% 
Low income  524 Low income  1,407  972,975 15% 
Middle income  3,211 Middle income  6,154 4,650,561 69% 
Lower middle income  2,015 Lower middle income  4,592 3,702,108  
Upper middle income  7,878 Upper middle income  12,297  948,453  
Low & middle income  2,748 Low & middle income  5,330 5,623,536 84% 
High income  39,345 High income  37,141 1,068,525 16% 
East Asia & Pacific  2,515 East Asia & Pacific  5,398 1,931,288  
Europe & Central Asia  7,418 Europe & Central Asia  12,219 441,375  
Latin America & Caribbean  6,780 Latin America & Caribbean  10,309 565,294  
Middle East & North Africa  3,242 Middle East & North Africa  7,308 324,786  
South Asia  986 South Asia  2,734 1,542,836  
Sub-Saharan Africa  1,082 Sub-Saharan Africa  1,991  817,957  
Euro area  38,821 Euro area  33,228  325,947  




The terrible effects of unethical behaviour in large firms, and in human society on a global 
scale can be perceived in the financial crisis that rocked the world in the years 2008-09. 
The story of the global financial crisis caused by the Sub-prime mortgage financial scandal 
in 2008-2009 and the way it was handled showed the mismanagement of financial 
institutions at the turn of the 20th century. Unethical behaviour in many financial firms, 
especially in the United States of America and Western Europe during this period resulted 
in a global economic crisis which, as I write this thesis, is still unresolved. A salient 
feature of the current financial crisis is that it has been incubated by the ‘financialization’ 
of Western economies, most notably the US economy, which created an abundance of 
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credit and encouraged excessive risk-taking through complex financial instruments 
(derivatives, credit default swaps) and corporate structures and ineffective regulatory 
mechanisms. Banks, hedge funds and insurance companies have been key actors in the 
financialization of the economy and are estimated to have lost around US$2.8 trillion123. 
0.16 Ineptitude in Managing the Economy  
The crisis was blamed on 'a culture of irresponsibility'. The US government closed 22 
banks, according to the federal deposit Insurance Corporation, including Lehman Brothers, 
Washington Mutual and Indymac124. It has rescued Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and Bear 
Stearns and created a bailout fund of $700 billion to purchase stakes in troubled banks. 
Altogether the US government has committed nearly $8.5 trillion, around 60% of its gross 
domestic product, to arrest the collapse of its financial system125. The European Central 
Bank has provided around €467 billion to support banks. Germany has set aside over 
US$400 billion to bailout ailing banks. So far, Ireland, Iceland, Hungary and Turkey have 
sought financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to manage the 
crisis. The social cost of the unfolding crisis is difficult to estimate, but vast amounts of 
public money are being used to prop-up distressed financial enterprises. For example, in 
addition to providing huge sums to stimulate banking liquidity, the UK government has set 
aside £500 billion (about US$750 billion) to support financial enterprises126. According to 
Sikka127, Several of the financial institutions closed, as a result of the financial crisis, had 
unqualified audit reports. The Table below shows their findings. 
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Table 2: 2008 Auditors and Distressed Banks 
 
Company 









UK 31.12.2007 D and T 4.3.2008 Unqualified £2.8 £2.1 
Alliance and 
Leicester 
UK 31.12.2007 D and T 19.2.2008 Unqualified £0.8 £0.8 
Barclays UK 31.12.2007 PwC 7.2.2008 Unqualified £29 £15 
Bear Stearns USA 30.11.2007 D and T 28.1.2008 Unqualified $23.4 $4.9 
Bradford and 
Bingley 




Guernsey 31.12.2007 PwC 27.2.2008 Unqualified N/A N/A 







28.3.2008 Unqualified €10.12 €1.48 
Fannie Mae USA 31.12.2007 D and T 26.2.2008 Unqualified $49.3 – 
Fortis Holland 31.12.2007 KPMG/
PwC 
6.3.2008 Unqualified €20 €17 
Freddie Mac USA 31.12.2007 PwC 27.2.2008 Unqualified $73.4 – 
Glitnir Iceland 31.12.2007 PwC 31.1.2008 Unqualified ISK146 ISK218 
HBOS UK 31.12.2007 KPMG 26.2.2008 Unqualified £9.0 £2.4 
Hypo Real 
Estate 
Germany 31.12.2007 KPMG 25.3.2008 Unqualified €5.4 €5.7 
Indymac USA 31.12.2007 E and Y 28.2.2008 Unqualified $5.7 $0.5 
ING Holland 31.12.2007 E and Y 17.3.2008 Unqualified €68 €7 
Kaupthing 
Bank 
Iceland 31.12.2007 KPMG 30.1.2008 Unqualified ISK421 ISK74 
Landsbanki Iceland 31.12.2007 PwC 28.1.2008 Unqualified ISK259 ISK46 
Lehman 
Brothers 
USA 30.11.2007 E and Y 28.1.2008 Unqualified $27.8 $3.5 














UK 31.12.2006 PwC 27.02.2008 Unqualified £1.3 £0.7 
Royal Bank 
of Scotland 
UK 31.12.2007 D and T 27.2.2008 Unqualified £17 £14.4 
TCF Financial 
Corp 
USA 31.12.2007 KPMG 14.2.2008 Unqualified $0.97 $0.05 
Thornburg 
Mortgage 
USA 31.12.2007 KPMG 27.2.2008 Unqualified $2.1 $0.4 
UBS Switzerlan
d 




US Bancorp USA 31.12.2007 E and Y 20.2.2008 Unqualified $7.5 $9.6 
Wachovia USA 31.12.2007 KPMG 25.2.2008 Unqualified $29.2 $4.1 
Washington 
Mutual 
USA 31.12.2007 D and T 28.2.2008 Unqualified $10.7 $4.3 
Source: Sikka, Prem. Financial crisis and the silence of the auditors, Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 2009, vol. 34, issue 6-7, pages 868-873. p 870 
 
Sikka’s research found out that in the Auditing Practices Board, 2004a, adverse “key 
financial ratios” are considered to be an indicator of going concern problems and major 
institutions acquired leverage ratios in the range of 11:1–83:1. Excessive leverage has the 
potential to increase liquidity risk and jeopardize bank survival. For example, a report by 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) noted that Bear Stearns “was highly 
leveraged, with a gross leverage ratio of approximately 33 to 1 prior to its collapse”. One 
expert informed the US House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform that Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank, “had a 
leverage of more than 30 to 1. With this leverage, a mere 3.3% drop in the value of assets 
wipes out the entire value of equity and makes the company insolvent”128. This is a 
manifestation that the check systems in the financial institutions concerned and in the 
governments where the series disinvestments were committed are not effective. 
In addition to the sub-prime mortgages financial crisis at the beginning of the 21st century, 
there was also the financial scum perpetrated by the former NASDAQ chairman, Bernard 
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Madoff.  When he was arrested for swindling investors off approximately $50 billion, 
Bernard Madoff confessed, "There is no innocent explanation." Observers believed that 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the United States of America would 
have been spurred into action against the alleged mastermind of a $50 billion fraud sooner 
if more people had come forward129. The overall judgment is that there is a widely 
accepted artificial separation between economic activity and morality. It is this has led 
man to develop economic life, and processes in institutions in a destructive manner, 
leading to the loss of economic, social and political systems that trample upon personal 
and social freedom, and are therefore unable to deliver the justice that they promise130. 
0.17 Unemployment and Economic Suffering 
The effects of such unethical action in business institutions breed uncertainty over 
working conditions caused by mobility and deregulation. When such practices become 
endemic, they tend to create new forms of psychological instability, making it difficult to 
forge coherent life-plans, including marriage. This leads to ‘wastage’ of human and social 
capital in labour and social resources. Human beings suffer unemployment and economic 
uncertainties which in turn provoke economic marginalization131. Benedict XVI says to 
the governments engaged in boosting the world's economic and social assets, that the 
primary capital to be safeguarded and valued is man, the human person in his or her 
integrity: “Man is the source, the focus and the aim of all economic and social life”.132 
0.18 Conclusions 
Tables 1 and 2 shows the dismal efforts of Man’s progress towards achieving the material 
well-being (which has become somewhat synonymous with an empirical measurable, i.e. 
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economics has become more or less a quantitative measurable reality) and high level 
prevalence of unethical conduct. The 2008 Gross National Productivity figures show that 
84% of the world’s population lives in the low and middle income group while 16% are 
those who live above in the high income group. The global competitive rankings of the 
world economic forum demonstrate in a more detailed analysis this general inequality in 
the distribution of the world’s riches. They at least consider new parameters that try to 
measure the qualitative aspects. 
There has been an improvement over the last two decades in analyzing nation-state 
performance from an economic perspective. Based on the World’s Economic Forum 
(WEF) global competitiveness structure analysis one sees an increasing recognition of the 
important role education and culture play besides pure material productivity analysis. 
Global Competitiveness is defined as, the set of institutions, policies, and factors that 
determine the level of productivity of a country. The level of productivity, in turn, sets the 
sustainable level of prosperity that can be earned by an economy. For instance, the 2008-
09 report on global competitiveness133 shows twelve pillars of assessments, divided into 
three types of economies. Factor Driven economies are still heavily dependent on factor 
resources. The pillars of assessment for this level of economy include institutions, 
infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, health and primary education. Efficiency driven 
economies are measured according to their efficiency enhancers, higher education and 
training, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market 
sophistication, technological readiness and market size. The highly developed group of 
nations is measured according to their capacity of innovation. They are measured by their 
business sophistication and levels of innovation134. The rankings indicate that there are 
grave inequalities in the world. The inequalities are a result of unethical behaviour that 
range from pure ignorance, theft, greed, to sabotage, irresponsibility on the governments 
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assessment and management of institutions and other ills. Next is to consider in-depth the 
roots of this unethical behaviour in firms and institutions. 
The Roots of Unethical Behaviour in Firms 
0.19 Commercialization of Culture 
The spirit of capitalism has engendered a propensity to the spirit of ‘commercialization’. 
This means that a significant number of business persons have acquired utilitarian and 
‘consequentialist’ ethos135. As Sison explains, entrepreneurs ignore the inviolable dignity 
of the human person and the transcendent value of the natural moral norms. Accordingly, 
the ultimate justification of business practice would be found in the foreseen or 
consequential utility of actions and decisions. The consequence of this way of thinking is 
the generally accepted business principle that there is actually no such thing as inviolable 
dignity of human beings. The latter only exists to serve the decisions of the institutions. 
Neither is it reasonable to assign any transcendent value to moral norms in institutions, 
given no ethical norm exists save utility136. 
There has also been a general tendency of devaluing cultures which arises from the 
stripping of ethical and religious norms that provide the inherent dignity of man and 
society. Instead, cultures have been juxtaposed as essentially equal at the altar of 
commerce. Thus the bonding, beauteous, perfective and truthful values are not 
communicated to the new neighbours and new generations. The result is a loss of dialogue 
between and within cultures. Positive cultural enrichment among fellow men is at its 
lowest ebb. This in turn has led to what Benedict XVI calls cultural eclecticism and 
levelling, manifested by the ‘equating of cultures’ or cultural ‘relativism’ and the 
avoidance of a well thought out dialogue137 between cultures that encourages the sharing 
of true cultural values and at the same identifying divergent cultural issues that need to be 
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studied. Cultural relativism may lead to the loss of key societal values that have been 
cultivated throughout the history of a society. Hence, a certain alienation of culture from 
human life arises leading to the risk of new types of enslavement. While the complexity 
arising from the pervasive globalization of cultures is difficult to decipher and manage, 
and the egalitarian sentiment among all men is strong, historical experiences are different 
and have granted to each culture both some good and some evil. It is of essence that there 
arise dialogue among cultures to help man divine the good and eliminate the evil 
tendencies contrary to social unity. The presence of organizations that transcend national 
boundaries, in which people from many cultural backgrounds work together in common is 
very important and it is necessary that organizations undertake responsibility of cultural 
dialogue at every level. Common economic benefit cannot be the sole foundation of 
cultural unity in diversity. 
Take for instance the case of different religious cultures among men. The religions of the 
earth do not obey a unique principle from which all religion form a genre. There are 
different species of religion but not of the same genre. They form distinct beliefs with 
distinct customs, rites or rituals, codes of administration and therefore also different ways 
of understanding the reality of man and God and their relationship. Reality presents to us a 
clear distinction between different religions. However, one cannot completely deny that 
there is a common principle among them which is the desire for man to relate to the 
Divine and to define the human being from that perspective for the sake of the good of 
man. This is an expression of an age old principle prevalent throughout the history of man 
which indicates or shows man in search of the Divine truth. 
All men of all time have had to confront this question of the divine deriving from both the 
perception of man as an inadequate author of his own reality and divine revelation. This is 
known through the channels available throughout history which can be observed and 
understood from right human reason. Is there truth in all religions? One could say that 
there are fragments of truth in each religion and it behoves man, through the light of right 
reason, to look for these truths to accomplish their understanding of man’s relationship 
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with God and God’s relationship with nature. One could also say that, in as much as there 
are truths in religions, the adherents will always have a channel to reach the true reality of 
their destiny and live in truth. In as much as there isn’t truth in the religions, man has to 
use faith and reason to arrive at the truth and change or accept the new revelation. These 
fragments of truth are found in the doctrines, rituals or cults, customs in their generality 
and in the religious and profane realities of tradition and human wisdom. There are also 
reflections of teachings of nature, philosophical and rational in nature, which can be 
known and understood. 
Dialogue is essential because man’s nature always leads him to seek the fundamental truth 
underlying ‘his’ reality. Hence, pretending that ethical norms founded on religion and the 
dignity of man are irrelevant, not only would it be courting a lie about human nature but 
one could also be rejecting the profound reality. This can only demean human kind. Yet, 
while the contrary is true and one must dialogue in order to enrich his ‘truth’ about God, 
man and society and its environment, it should also be understood that the objective of this 
dialogue transcends human capability and therefore requires the help of a transcendent 
reality. Human reason can understand the end but only imperfectly etching the path 
towards that perfect universal society. If one should stop at mere respect of cultural 
plurality, and fear the arduous task of dialogue and change, he risks the impoverishment of 
human kind through cowardice and irrationality. That is the sign of a people without hope 
and destitute of values save that of demeaning mankind to the level of mere instinct or 
material beneficence, which is the lot of lower animals. Institutions need to salvage this 
hope in mankind and in his rationality to reach his perfective nature and life. 
0.20 The All Pervasive Culture of the Organization 
In business institutions culture in organizations has taken a special place within 
organizational theory and behaviour. Calvin Morril expresses this very well in his research 
work on culture and organizational theory. Quoting two authors, Barley and Kunda, he 
says that although earlier generations of organizational researchers referred to aspects of 
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culture, scholars did not systematically apply the term "culture" to organizations until the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, when they began to refer to organizations as "socially 
constructed systems of meaning"138. The theory of organizations as instruments of culture 
is therefore a most recent perception from a scholarly perspective. Nevertheless, the recent 
discovery among scholars in organizational behaviour does not nullify its critical role 
within the cultural context throughout history. Morril identifies the fact that as the cause 
for free markets and capitalist gain became both the utopian ends and grand motives 
underlying most social institutions, the rational organization, de-contextualized from local 
customs, came to be seen as the linchpin for realizing and sustaining market society. 
As markets and capitalist enterprises thrived, early organizational researchers… produced 
"hybrids" of theory and "applied practical discipline," [which] often viewed culture as 
superfluous to rational organizations, if not regarding it with outright hostility. 
Organization theory was about the hard edge of rationality, means-end thinking, and goals. 
Cultural arguments, by which most theorists meant non-rational "noise," were relegated to 
the study of custom and local social practice. Given the antipathy it received, culture 
ironically played important yet unacknowledged roles in early organization theory.139 As 
Ouchi testifies in his work, building organizational cultures became akin to building 
communities and tight-knit "clans," with their attendant images of mutual support, 
solidarity, and commitment (Ouchi 1980)140. 
Neo-institutional scholars such as Meyer and Rowan (1977), came to discover that 
business institutions (rational institutions) tended to dominate all other institutions when 
they discovered “the pervasive diffusion of cultural-cognitive models that emerged out of 
the Western European cultural watersheds of the Enlightenment, the Industrial and French 
Revolutions, and "market" projects of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These 
models privileged Western rationalist, means-end assumptions about reality and social 
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organization at all levels of analysis, thus creating a world culture dominated by the 
"Western cultural account" (Meyer et al. 1997)”141. Thus their conclusion that rational 
instrumental organizations dominate and persist on the contemporary scene not because 
they are technically superior on some universal [aspect]… but because they conform to a 
social reality and are deemed legitimate as defined by pervasively shared cultural 
assumptions142.  
To consider the cultural dimension of organizations is important because research has 
shown that, although complex in analysis, there is such a thing as social inequality and 
deviance, sacred rationalist concepts such as rationality and efficiency are interrogated, 
and their limitations and possibilities are revealed. What is emerging …is a realignment of 
organization theory that is bringing together theoretical approaches to power, culture, and 
agency into a useful analytic nexus and allowing sociologists to reassess the theory of 
society143. 
Having said that, it is necessary to emphasize that culture is something which human 
beings and society positively introduce into society. It is therefore the prerogative of man 
and his institutions to create an informed culture which fosters the flourishing of man and 
society. In building culture one ought to be aware of its content. This includes the culture 
of work (homo faber), of transmitting knowledge effectively to the present and future 
generations, of the artistic culture of creating (such as music), the culture of 
contemplation, the culture of peaceful common life (homo societus), of games (homo 
ludens), of understanding and loving suffering, and last of all but most important of all, of 
religiosity. It can be summarized as building a culture of work, education, art and 
artefacts, rest and entertainment, human virtues (ethics of practical life), and religion. 
These aspects are intertwined, each part playing its crucial role in building up a more 
perfect man and his society. 







These elements together provide the objective spirit of society as a consequence of the 
principles cultivated in people through the educational process. Historically, the ‘Woman’ 
has been profoundly responsible for carrying out this responsibility. Without her there is 
no particular family, this or that family, there is no growth of the family and culture. 
Children are the sign of hope in the future. If the children are not brought up within the 
family culture of Love there arise a lack of trust which breaks up the family harmony, 
peace and beauty of society. Constancy in education is necessary in order for values to 
inhere and culture to emerge. With a profound internal enrichment of people in a society, 
externally an enriching culture emerges as the product of that society. This beautiful 
expression of what individuals believe in is what institutions need to respect and to 
develop. It is lamentable that the enriching culture of many societies has almost died as a 
result of the dominance of unethical behaviour in business or ‘coercion’ through the 
business ‘educative’ processes. 
José María Barrio, quoting Jungmann, says that education is the process of inserting 
someone into reality144. Sometimes it is a process and sometimes the result of a process, as 
Antonio Livi says; which could be defined as the help which a person or group of people, 
or institution, lends to another person or group of persons in order to develop and perfect 
their being in diverse aspects (material and spiritual, individual and social)145. It comes 
from the Latin word e-ducare, which means to lead another from one place to another146. 
Education also consists of forming in courtesy, mannerisms, sciences, religion, physical 
well-being, human virtues, aesthetics or arts and in general social living147. Education, of 
whatever nature it may be, prepares one for life. However, all kinds of scandals in 
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business institutions make nurturing children complex (at times seemingly insuperable as 
the case of city slum dwellers is) because of what the reality really is148. 
0.22 Commercializing Human Dignity 
Upon prevailing over our infancy, and successfully arriving at ‘adulthood’, wherein we 
reach the capacity of alienating ourselves from the ‘sentimental life of the family’ and 
proffering our own reasons to the reality we see before us, the only thing we are sure off is 
the monetary value or cost of things. Most people measure the value of things according to 
the price bestowed upon them by the market forces149. All pre-mercantile relationships and 
realities, such as the family, the church and the social relationships, are devalued in favour 
of dedicating our lives to the search for money. The focus is singularly in acquiring the 
technical competencies necessary for us to earn money. Important as working and earning 
money may be, one cannot lose what bestows value upon our work, which is family and 
society. In the second level, art, contemplation (rest), religion, music, humanistic 
education and entertainment enrich lives. It is these things that make one creative on the 
one hand and enriches the intellect and life in general on the other. Life is made worth 
living. The perfection of life should not be relegated to the abysmal path or ‘rat race’ of 
making more and more money in view of institutional competitiveness and economic 
benefit. When an institution considers these dimensions of the person and inculcates this 
perspective in itself, it becomes a humanistic organization. Business institutions therefore 
participate in the education of persons and societies, both from an internal and external 
perspective. Having considered the internal perspective in the paragraph above we ought 
to mull over the external educative function of the business institution. 
From childhood we live and learn using products provided by business institutions and 
whose prices are determined in the market environment. They range from food, water and 
other drinks, clothe, houses, books, entertainment, games, art and all sorts of amenities 
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that satisfy human needs. Even formal education has become largely commercialized. An 
example is Britain. Sally Tomlinson in-depth research into education in Britain says that 
since 1945, there has been a shift from a relatively decentralized education system to a 
centralized system, in which funding, teaching and curriculum are centrally controlled, 
and the subjection of schools to market forces has increased social and academic 
divisions150. The resultant effect is that business institutions are playing a crucial educative 
role in society through these ‘commercialised’ services. While they serve a very important 
role in society, they also have commercialized even what can be considered outside the 
zone of commercialization. 
Referring to norms and values of society, businesses have created needs that are suspect 
and have sometimes resulted in profound harm to society such as the sub-prime mortgage 
scandal mentioned earlier. Advertisements have profoundly affected the value system; 
especially the values regarding sex and marital life. In some societies, sexual morality is 
entirely upside down. Worse still, the market environment is nourished by triviality and 
indifference leading the social education systems to renounce anything that would not be 
strategic to the principal mission of economic benefit. Societies have become what 
Spaemann calls ‘hypothetical societies’ in which the value of reality is essentially defined 
by the exchange value. Hence, one buys cars because they are cheaper and have the latest 
gadget or technology. One changes clothes merely because businesses have created a ‘new 
fashion’151. Where everything is on sale convictions and values of life are expendable and 
are to be eliminated when human instinct calls for it. As Spaemann (2007, 40) sees it, what 
apportions value to the social system becomes the market place152. 
Human life has also run into grave risk of being commercialized as a result of the 
contraceptive mentality, human trafficking and commercialization of human organs, 
abortion and euthanasia. All these malpractices are allowed as measures of ‘improving 
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economic life’. As Benedict XVI notes, some non-governmental organizations work 
actively to spread abortion, at times promoting the practice of sterilization in poor 
countries, in some cases not even informing the women concerned153. As Coleman et al, 
find out after an empirical research on the effects of abortion in Chicago, for men and 
women, the experience of an abortion in a previous relationship was related to negative 
outcomes in the current relationship; perceptions of improved quality of life if the current 
relationship also ended and intimate partner violence. Experience of an abortion within a 
current relationship was associated with 116% and 196% increased risk of arguing about 
children for women and men, respectively. Among females, experience of an abortion 
within a current relationship was associated with increased risk for various forms of sexual 
dysfunction (122–182%), increased risk of arguments about money (75%), increased risk 
of conflict about the partner's relatives (80%), and increased risk of arguing about the 
respondent's relatives (99%). Men whose current partners had experienced an abortion 
were more likely to report jealousy (96% greater risk) and conflict about drugs (385% 
greater risk) 154. 
0.23 Commoditizing Truth, Empty Sophistication 
Observing western societies from a general historical perspective there are complex social 
‘pathologies’ that have left human beings in our time rather perplexed. The work of an 
illustrious ‘humanist’, Alejandro Llano155, serves to enlighten the nature of this 
complexity. In a society where the traditional institutions (in the general sense of the 
word), which offer certainty on norms of action and application, have been replaced 
largely by institutions whose purposes intend economic benefit, the firm ground of truth 
and trust disappears and what is left is a profound relativism in judging what is right and 
wrong. The same relativism shrouds the mind with regard to morally prudent actions and 
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applications. Society then faces segmentation, perversity, anomia, and implosion. In the 
end, as Ortega and Gasset quip, ‘what is happening to us is that we do not know what is 
happening to us”. 
Segmentation156 refers to the increasing fragmentation in the ambit of social processes. It 
is principally manifested by the presence of a complex of scientific perspectives and social 
institutions each purporting to deal with social problems from its own perspective, quite 
distinct from the others. Hence, social development is seen from the different dimensions 
of the environmentalist, sociologist, the physicist, the politician, the businessman, the 
clergy, the economist, the doctor, the teacher, the poor and the rich among many others. 
What complicates the issue more is that the different protagonists rarely synergise one 
with the others. With great frequency therefore one starts solving a problem and ends up 
forgetting the objective in question only to end up spending so much money, time and 
effort in the dispersion created. The effect of this complexity is resolving the immediate 
practical obstacles and keeping things together. The ultimate solution is often left in 
suspense. For Novak what matters is pragmatism. He refers to this state of affairs as the 
success of democracy, liberalism, and market economies, where man glories in 
“divergence, dissent, and singularity” and invents “practical principles embodied in 
institutions… jealously guarded by rival interests, each of considerable power, by which 
social cooperation may be achieved without prior agreement on metaphysical, 
philosophical, or religious presuppositions’157. Yet, it seems probable that a combination 
of democracy, liberalism, free markets; - the ‘practical’ religion – leaves one with the lack 
of inviolable norms (anomia), in a state of ‘flux’ in every aspect of his mental state; a man 
emptied of any internal values and in a state of self implosion. 
Perversion158 refers to the state in which personal and social action experience a process of 
distortion for the lack of firm principles to adhere to, except of course the seeking of 
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economic benefits. The only true realities are life, death and money, and power and 
pleasure in between. The rest is relative. Whatever ‘right’ action one takes may turn into a 
‘boomerang’ and therefore any action is in the same measure. 
As mentioned before, Llano sees many in western societies in a state of anomia159 (without 
norms). This means a state in which there is a general lack of sound and inviolable norms 
which persons and society adhere to or identify with. Although freedom from government 
regulation, and for that matter, from any other institution may neutralise tyranny, 
deregulation could, on the other hand, result in loss of trust in others. When someone is 
not certain of a good outcome from good actions or the error arising from bad actions, 
experience shows that that person ends up in a state of confusion and indecisiveness. 
Speculation and short-term gains become attractive. Hence, Mac Iver explains that 
‘Anomia is the spiritual state of a person who has lost his moral roots, who has no rules or 
regulations save isolated stimulus deficient of any sense of continuity of groups and 
obligations. The anomic man is spiritually sterile, egotistic, and responsible to no one, 
save himself. He is cynical of the values demonstrated by other persons. His only faith is 
in the philosophy of negation. His life is walking the tenuous line of instincts, blind to the 
past or the future. The state of anomia is akin to a spiritual situation in which the 
individual shutters his sense of societal cooperation, which is the fundamental source of 
moral certitude160. Ironically in this situation a person ends up much like a ‘statue’ 
demonstrating its liberty; a mere symbol of his own individuality. 
Ultimately that person suffers a state of implosion161. The vacuous emptiness of such a 
person is transmitted to the social institutions as Llano predicts. These institutions 
experience a ‘dry implosion’ produced by the ‘emptiness’ or lack of new ‘vigorous’ ideas. 
Considering the many business or financial institutions listed above, one observes that 
they are institutions of great renown in society, where for example, many seek 
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employment: Enron, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Barclays U.K. or inept governments 
among others. However, the same is experienced in other institutions of a primordial 
nature such as families, cultural institutions and Universities. The pain in all these is that 
the latter institutions are actually dying a ‘real death’: That is, they rarely seem to recover 
from their lack of creativity. The former somehow mutate into new well ‘capitalized’ 
firms as a result of ‘new’ funding from financial institutions and governments. Business 
institutions in a capitalist world have only one ultimate moral norm, which is to make 
money as Milton Friedman had suggested. 
0.24 Conclusions 
This paragraph demonstrates that, in part, the root cause of unethical behaviour in firms is 
a loss of the principles that confer human dignity. Human dignity is frequently measured 
according to material wealth. Secondly, the pursuit for natural material wealth 
indispensable to the common good of society has been substituted with the desire to 
‘possess material goods’ as an end not a means to a higher goal. Goods of an immaterial 
nature (spiritual) are ignored in favour of a ‘commercialization’ of culture which measures 
most things in financial terms. Development is purely seen as a matter of the level of 
material possessions. Yet, as Benedict XVI advises, this only creates an illusion built on a 
negative principle, which is the denial of man’s transcendent dimension. [Man] becomes a 
means to development rather than the goal of development. Besides requiring freedom, 
integral human development as a vocation demands respect for its truth. “Authentic” 
development must be “integral, that is, it has to promote the good of every man and of the 
whole man”162. 
Material possessions and reason alone cannot furnish the true nature of social coexistence. 
A lot has already been written, in Aristotle and Aquinas, about friendship, the source of 
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this fraternal communicatio163. In addition, the firm is to be organised as a type of 
‘community’. However, with the loss of the transcendental dimension of man it is evident 
that the evils of, tyranny, oligarchy and populism (distortion of timocracy)164 are re-
emerging in our global society. The firm has become an instrument of many evils 
mentioned. In order to reassert the true role of business and other institutions a new way of 
assessing it has to be found; a methodology and theory that will take into account the 
transcendental dimensions of society and man. 
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Proposing a Common Good Evaluation of the Firm 
Smithian Capitalism and Market Economies 
1.1 Basis for Disillusionment in liberal democratic capitalism 
It is necessary to study the overarching spirit of liberalism, democratic capitalism and free 
‘mercantilism’ in western society. These structures inform virtually every institutional 
framework and are used as diagnostic principles of both ailing economies and successful 
livelihoods. To these principles have been attributed the phenomenal growth of economies 
over the last century. One can almost say that we are experiencing the ‘wealth of the 
nations’. On the other hand, there is an incessant perpetration of injustice on man and a 
destruction of the moral fabric of societies. Much literature in business ethics attribute 
injustices in capitalistic societies to unbridled self-interest manifested in the selfish pursuit 
of material wealth (profits) among business institutions, owners and managers of 
businesses at the expense of the common good of society. Although part of “the business 
of business is to make profits for the shareholders” it is clear that a business is formed in 
partnership with many other people other than the owners. All these ‘stakeholders’ require 
the business to act in their interest. Businesses are institutions needed by society to enable 
it achieve the common good. Therefore, a business should contribute to the good of the 
immediate stakeholders first and secondly enable the society it operates in achieve the 
common good. 
In questioning the thought processes or theory of ‘capitalism’ as a system, it turns out 
rather appropriate to associate it with Adam Smith. Many consider him the founder of the 
classical school of modern capitalistic thought165. Over the years, firms have grown in size 
and nature. They have evolved from the prevalence of the cottage industry to large multi-
national firms many times larger than national economies. Many people, such as Michael 
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Novak, Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls, perceive this to have been the result of democratic 
capitalism and free market systems. Novak alludes to the watershed of democratic 
capitalism in 1776 (the year of Independence of the United States of America) as 
coinciding almost simultaneously with Adam Smith’s “An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations” 166. Novak characterizes the world economic 
environment before this watershed as a general ‘disaster’. Historically for him, the 
political economy was mainly mercantilist, steeped in famines, plagues and general 
malaise. Novak notes that in 1780, 90 percent of the economies devoted themselves in 
supplying bread to stay alive. Life expectancy in 1795 France was 27.3 years for women 
and 23.4 years for men. Income earnings in Germany were so low that fewer than 1000 
people enjoyed a salary above USD $1,000167. Novak’s diagnosis is that at the onset of 
democratic capitalism, the concept of development only existed in ‘Adam Smith’s book168. 
It was a ‘mostly torpid world’ then. 
Besides poor economic structures in 1800, self-government was also uncommon and only 
existed in Great Britain and the United States of America. Novak proposes that the 
invention of the market economy in Great Britain and the United States of America ‘more 
profoundly revolutionized the world between 1800 and the present than any other single 
force before. Real wages quadrupled between 1800 and 1900 and since at the same time 
population in Great Britain quadrupled, it means that the economic growth within a 
century was 1600%. In addition, there was a considerable increase in the liberty of 
personal choice, ‘in a varied diet, new skills, and new vocations’. All the while, according 
to Novak, the powers in the Christian church did not understand the foundations of the 
new economic order and chose instead ‘to douse the new fire’169. 
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Milton Friedman, a proponent of the free market system, suggested that “to speak of social 
responsibility is subversive”170. Others, such as Enrique de Sendagorta Aramburu, (a 
renowned Spanish naval engineer, businessman of vast exploits and a leader), contend that 
an entrepreneur’s work is arduous. It involves choosing, renouncing, sacrifice, battle, 
taking risks, commitment to ones word, and every action in which man exercises his 
values, vital principles and freedom. The entrepreneur therefore cannot turn away from 
ethics nor narrow his interests to the unique objective of measurable economic parameters. 
Sendagorta is convinced that man in society is not purely the ‘homo economicus’ of Adam 
Smith171. Man is also called to ‘virtue’ or ethical action and this dimension of man in 
society is not necessarily ‘measurable’ in purely economic parameters used in today’s 
economic predisposition. This is because the firm impacts several aspects of society. 
Among the interested parties of a business are, employees, investors, financiers, suppliers, 
insurance companies, employees’ families, customers, interested groups, governments, 
communities, cultural institutes, ecologists, schools, universities, means of 
communication, the world of art, religious institutions, foundations and others. The 
interested parties can either directly or indirectly impact or are impacted upon by 
businesses. Hence, the business of business cannot be purely business as Friedman says. 
There is a common good or universal good to which it is called to serve. Business qua 
business is not an end in itself, least of all the objective of maximizing economic benefits 
regardless of the consequences. 
1.2 The ‘Civic Faith’ 
There are those who try to sanctify ‘capitalism’ in its classical sense. That is, they try to 
correct the misunderstanding over the nature of capitalism. According to Novak, Smith’s 
system called for nations as well as individuals to seek the development of their own 
wealth. It awakens, he says, individuals and nations to their own capacities for 
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imagination, self-improvement and growth. Hence, the ‘prudence’ of ‘selfishness’, of 
solely seeking one’s own benefit in economic activity ultimately results in the economic 
development of nations. How? Michael Novak identifies the breeding of cooperation from 
selfishness to Jacques Maritain’s concept of civic or practical faith. This should happen 
because Capitalism glories in divergence, dissent, and singularity. It invents practical 
principles embodied in institutions and jealously guarded by rival interests, each of 
considerable power, by which social cooperation is achieved without prior agreement on 
metaphysical, philosophical, or religious presuppositions’172. This is the novel concept of 
‘secular faith or civic faith’ used by Jacque Maritain173 and interpreted by Michael Novak. 
According to Maritain, “Secular faith” or “Civic faith” is the practical principle of 
cooperation among citizens such as is found in the United States of America. It consists in 
the ‘convergence’ of people with different or even opposite metaphysical or religious 
outlook (Novak, 1982). Convergence arises from an analogical similitude in practical 
principles and in the sharing the same practical secular faith, founded in truth and 
intelligence, human dignity, freedom, brotherly love and absolute value for the moral 
good”174. It is to be distinguished from ...theoretical justifications... or philosophical or 
religious creeds which propose these practical conclusions through the use of reason175. 
1.3 The Foundations of Liberal Capitalism Ethics 
Adam Smith’s expounded the ‘market place’ morality in his “Theory of Moral 
Sentiments” published in 1759. Moral science in Adam Smith has nothing to do with good 
or evil as may be indicated by the intellect through speculative or theoretical reason. 
Man’s life is a conjunction of various primary passions and reason is not an important part 
of it. Smith explains that “whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may be 
excited, nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the 
                                                 
172 Novak, Michael. The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, P 65 
173 Ibid., P 65 
174 Ibid., P66 
175 Novak, Michael. The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, P 66, quoting Jacques Maritain, Man and the 
State; University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1951. P 111 
70 
 
emotions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the 
contrary... We should have indulged, we say; perhaps, have approved of the violence of 
his emotion, had the cause been in any respect proportioned to it”176. 
Smith latter on explains that, “It is thus that man, who can subsist only in society, was 
fitted by nature to that situation for which he was made. All the members of human society 
stand in need of each other’s assistance, and are likewise exposed to mutual injuries. 
Where the necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded from love, from gratitude, from 
friendship, and esteem, the society flourishes and is happy. All the different members of it 
are bound together by the agreeable bands of love and affection, and are, as it were, drawn 
to one common centre of mutual good offices”177. Man at the mercy of passions was a 
very wide-spread doctrine by the end of the 17th century. We see it in David Hume, 
Roschefoucald, Maneville, Bentham and Helvetius among others. For Adam Smith, the 
word sympathy is used to denote that “fellow feeling with any passion whatsoever”; a 
feeling of both pity and Joy; and it is “only by the imagination that we can form any 
conception of what are his sensations”178. 
Adam Smith was preoccupied with the concept of man as a social being179. However, his 
preoccupation was to observe the laws that give rise to human actions in society much like 
Newton searched for the laws of physics. This idea forms the underlying principle in all 
his works both specific and general. Since economics presupposes man as the protagonist 
in economic activities and as the end objective of economic actions180, man’s protagonism 
in the market place, for Smith, is primarily as a ‘spectator and sympathizer’. As a 
spectator, man imagines (makes an ‘impression of his own senses’) the agent. Thus, Smith 
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explains that, “we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same 
person with the agent”181. When “we feel with the other”, what we do is to approve or 
disapprove of the other’s situation. This over time forms the basis of our moral judgment, 
because in time we realize we are judging an action when we ‘sympathize’ with the other. 
This principle of ‘empathy’ (empathy, describes more perfectly the nature of Smith’s 
sympathy) is inscribed in our human nature, and therefore men unfailingly socialize. From 
Imagination, one derives the principle of analogy. The principle upon which one is able to 
judge the situation of the other objectively, taking into account the context and therefore 
approving or disapproving of the situation. Smith had two typologies of man; the first 
being men who show themselves as virtuous (the benevolent) and secondly those who 
form the gross mass of humanity. 
The virtuous or benevolent people are very few in society. They aspire to perfection and 
aim at the divine model. This for him is proper to God and not to men. The second group, 
by far the greatest majority of men, simply tries to reach “correctness” in their actions; so 
that they are approved by the others by not being too outstanding or on the other hand too 
bad. They are not searching for divine wisdom or virtue. They just want to reach the level 
of social acceptance and seek no more182. This is Smith’s prudence. The greater masses of 
society have to practice Prudence. It is the care and effort made in achieving our self-
interest; above all fortune, health, fame, and career progress. The greater majority of men 
are occupied, in fact, in trying to fulfil their own self-interest. 
In Smith the virtue of justice limits us by enabling us not to do anything prejudicial to 
others. He understands justice in a negative way. It is not a virtue which helps us to serve 
others actively, but rather one that “watches” over us not to do harm to others. It is not 
defined by our effort to be good to others but rather it is observed in our avoiding doing 
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evil to others. From here one can deduce that the principle motive that guides most men in 
Society is self-interest. This self-interest acts as the motor regulating social harmony. 
When everyone is concerned with achieving their own self-interest (prudence) and they do 
not injure others (justice), then social conflicts are avoided. 
Smith, much like our contemporary capitalist, was disillusioned by the ill beneficence and 
practicality of religious institutions. His theory of moral sentiments emphasizes that 
Justice is the key virtue to be lived in society in order to have peace. Putting it another 
way, when the principle of universal Christian Love, “love others as I have loved you”, is 
stowed away as impracticable, it has to be replaced by another which is “love others as 
they love you”. Universal love is therefore substituted by an egoistic, calculating love. In 
general man is motivated only by his self-interest and very rarely motivated for the good 
of the other. Moral measurement, that is, the knowledge that one is or is not being 
approved by the others, serves to limit his self interest. This is necessary since man is 
primarily a dependent being and thus needs the others in society in order to be able to 
count on their help and not to be excluded from their dealings. 
Unlike Hobbes, who sees man as a ‘victim’ of society and who requires the moral figure 
of the absolute sovereign, as the only way to overcome that irremediable egoism, Smith 
esteems man as able to coexist with the others because of this self interest. He only needs 
to learn how to use it in favour of another and of his society. Rosanvallon insists that the 
science that Adam Smith produces is a science of “the civil society and from the civil 
society” 183. 
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Civil society is a market society (homo economicus) where everyone is interested in the 
exchange of goods and services for self-profit and utility. Man is principally a social being 
who acquires and owns property through commerce and the true society for him is the 
market economy. The regulating mechanism of the market is prudence and justice as 
Smith construes them. If there is an excellent or benevolent man, his benevolence is 
something gratuitous. Smith is not a theoretical founder of an independent economic 
science. He is a philosopher imbued in his own Scottish tradition in the ‘enlightenment’ 
period which understood that human peaceful socialization is not obtained by religion. The 
Europe of his time was no longer understood in terms of a Christian unity or a political 
unit. Rosanvallon is once more on target: “the science of wealth is understood as a science 
of the administration of modern civil society in the context of a state of law”184. The 
Smithian economy is a philosophical solution based on the anthropological categories and 
the society he lived in. For society to work it is enough that man uses his enlightened 
pride. This system is also Smith’s solution for the distribution of wealth among people. If 
wealth is not properly distributed, there will not be peace in society. 
For distribution to take place Smith makes use of the principle of the division of labour. 
This occurs when man’s work becomes increasingly specialized. Man becomes much like 
a machine and therefore more efficient. Specialization at the work place breeds the need 
for more labour and therefore most people find themselves employed. As Rachel Lázaro185 
puts it, Smith’s division of labour presupposes that there is a great amount of work to be 
done such that it is impossible for one man or a few to do it. Hence, man will always 
desire to work among his ilk, otherwise he cannot be efficient and highly productive. 
Secondly, the vast majority of workers are simply workers who follow orders; thirdly, 
there will be some, distinct from the ordinary workers, who will innovate new machines to 
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improve work efficiency and accelerate productivity. Finally, every man in society, in one 
way or the other, buys from or sells goods or merchandise to the others. This results in the 
distribution of wealth since one prince cannot own all the merchandise186. 
Man dedicates long hours to work in exchange for a wage and he hardly has time to 
himself. Nor do demands on him to cultivate his mind prosper. This continues until a point 
when he becomes clumsy and susceptible to numerous superstitions due to his lack of 
education. This last idea makes Smith provide new solutions. The first is a standard public 
education to ensure a minimum technical and cultural formation. Secondly, men should 
have some form of religion, not for its supernatural or salvific content, but because 
religion in principle always contributes to a certain moral code of behaviour that favours 
good social order. Finally, he suggests entertainment as one more means to avoid 
superstition and to occupy the little time man has away from work. All these form the 
roles which government should undertake; that is besides its role in ensuring the success 
of the law of self-interest in the market place. 
1.5 Adam Smith’s Theology 
From the foregoing it can be concluded that Adam smith is ‘pessimistic’ of a moral ethic 
based on reason and religious principles. He was critical of ‘great religions’ which enjoyed 
state support. He prefers a nation where there are many ‘sects’ in the market place so that 
their teachings are rendered rather ineffective and therefore do not trouble public 
tranquillity. In the 5th chapter of the ‘Wealth of Nations’ his statement is rather clear. “if 
we consider the matter more closely, we shall find, that this interested diligence of the 
clergy is what every wise legislator will study to prevent; because, in every religion except 
the true, it is highly pernicious, and it has even a natural tendency to pervert the true, by 
infusing into it a strong mixture of superstition, folly, and delusion.” He further says that, 
“the interested and active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and troublesome 
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only where there is, either but one sect tolerated in the society, or where the whole of a 
large society is divided into two or three great sects… But that zeal must be altogether 
innocent where the society is divided into two or three hundred, or perhaps into as many 
thousand small sects, of which no one could be considerable enough to disturb the public 
tranquillity. The teachers of each sect, seeing themselves surrounded on all sides with 
more adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candour and moderation 
which is so seldom to be found among the teachers of those great sects, whose tenets, 
being supported by the civil magistrate, are held in veneration by almost all the inhabitants 
of extensive kingdoms and empires, and who therefore see nothing round them but 
followers, disciples, and humble admirers.”187  
Actually, Smith’s ideas on religion are significantly affected by the philosophy of David 
Hume, whom he refers to as ‘by far the most illustrious philosopher and historian of the 
present age’. He teaches that there should be a free market place for religion where 
everyone chooses as they wish, and in the end... prove advantageous to the political 
interests of society." [David Hume, History of England, ch. 29.]188 For Smith, religion is to 
be equated with superstition and it is only useful to encourage suitable human conduct in 
social life. It is irrelevant that this belief is true or false. In every religion, and in every 
superstition that the world has ever beheld, accordingly, there has been a Tartarus as well 
as an Elysium; a place provided for the punishment of the wicked, as well as one for the 
reward of the just.”189 
James Alvey analyses Smith’s concept of teleology and proposes that one can infer in 
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments190, that God’s wisdom (design) is demonstrated 
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throughout the universe and the means being nicely adjusted to produce self preservation 
and procreation. Smith confirms that the human constitution also follows this design.191 
Alvey’s argument is confirmed by Lisa Hill192. The uniformity of the design suggests that 
there was a single designer who drew up a grand blueprint of the universe before creating 
it in accordance with the plan193. Human beings have been provided with the means of 
survival and self propagation gratuitously by nature. These are the instincts of drinking, 
eating, having sex, and so on. Smith sees these means fulfilling the instincts of the 
passions; “hunger, thirst, the passion which unites the sexes, the love of pleasure, and the 
dread of pain…” Therefore, the instincts drive us to adopt the appropriate means “without 
any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends, which the director of nature 
[God] intended to produce by them.”194 Thus, God is the designer and only that. Having 
designed the world, God left it to be guided by human actions primarily driven by instincts 
or passions. 
1.6 Applying Smith’s Religious Principles in the Market Place 
Alvey adds three other ends of man’s nature according to Smith; the order of the world, 
and the perfection and happiness of human nature…and to some extent human freedom195. 
For instance, Smith says that, “[Without trade restrictions] the obvious and simple system 
of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man...is left perfectly free to 
pursue his own interest in his own way.... The sovereign is completely discharged from… 
the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the 
employments most suitable to the interest of the society.”196 Although the ends of man are 
only known rationally, that rationality is inherent in our instincts which direct us to these 
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ends. Man’s reason has little or no role to pay since the design is God’s and not that of 
man. As Alvey explains, it seems that nature was wisely created by the director of nature, 
God, to achieve these ends. Teleology is immanent in the human constitution…197 Lisa 
Hill, asserts that Smith‘s hidden theology can be “made evident by examining and 
disclosing the workings of his spontaneous generation or ‘invisible hand’ arrangement and 
by exploring its most important constituent elements; a “faculty psychology and natural 
theology198. Jacob Viner on the other hand has contested this claim holding that, owing to 
the secularization of the disciplines of economics and ethics, Smith’s system has been 
stripped of its ‘integral’ Providentialism (Viner 1972: 81–2)199. That be as it may, does not 
dissolve the inherent mind and ‘secret’ religion of Smith qua Smith and his works. 
1.7 Synthesis of Smith’s Concept of Person and Society 
Summarizing Smith’s philosophy of society, one can say that, human ethics is the ethics of 
human instincts as modified by natural justice. Natural justice, as previously alluded to, is 
the justice of respecting others and ‘sympathizing’ with their good or sorrow. What 
renders a human being social, and consequently gives the rationale to society, is this 
natural, a priori, capacity in our instincts to ‘feel with the other’ (sympathy). The highest 
level of achievement for the gross masses in society is to arrive at being acceptable and 
respected in society’. Virtuous people, who act according to the virtue of beneficence, are 
few and are an exception and therefore do not fall within the gross mass of humanity. One 
therefore has to find a genuine law or solution for the general masses; and this according 
to Smith is prudence, to act according to their selfish needs, and justice, respecting other’s 
rights through the medium of ‘sympathy’. That system has come to be known as 
“capitalism”, or “laissez faire” system, in which natural human passions are left to 
moderate and develop market place. 
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Further, human beings have to be prudent; which means freely acting according to the 
instinct of self preservation and self-propagation. Man’s instincts or passions simply and 
naturally aim at the perfection of the individual man himself and alone; not society. 
However, the society is no worse for it since Man, is “led by an invisible hand to promote 
an end which was no part of his intention…By pursuing his own interest, he frequently 
promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.”200 
The outcome is self-perfection, social order and happiness in society without the medium 
of reason. The government is there to ensure the freedom of each individual to do exactly 
as his ego dictates and to ensure that anyone who contravenes this mode of practical 
behaviour is punished to serve as an example for others. The government, in addition, has 
to provide for education to ensure that the great masses of workers are trained; this in turn 
should increase efficiency in the work place. The little time spent away from work should 
be sprinkled with planned entertainment spots to keep the stress of the working class under 
control. As for the religious foundation of this mode of behaviour, Adam Smith leaves us 
the ‘profound’ insight that there is an author of the Universe, God, and that this creator has 
inserted the teleology of the world he created embedded in human instincts, which are to 
help man reach his natural end, individual happiness, self preservation, propagation and 
therefore order, perfection and happiness in society. If Paul Russell201 sees Adam Smith’s 
most eloquent tutor, David Hume, as ‘irreligious’ then given the religious interpretation 
above, Smith has similar inclinations, save that he seems to believe in one ‘supreme 
architect’ rather that the polytheistic inclination of Hume202. 
All these lead us to the conclusion that man is the sole steward of his destiny. In reality, 
how should man exercise this capitalist economic formula? From Smith’s perspective, 
man acquires his rights in his individual ‘pre-society’ state, before entering into a 
contractual agreement with the society. In the logic of capitalism, man is inserted into 
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society through the social contract. Salvador Giner expounds this idea lucidly; the spine of 
social convivence is the social contract in the sense that each one, from the ‘time’ so to 
speak, becomes a member of society he or she is obliged to fulfil their part of the contracts 
entered between them and  the state and with other citizens. This is what is important. 
Failure to do so would prompt the juridical arm of government to take corrective 
measures. The entrepreneur is not interested nor is he or she to be preoccupied with the 
actions of his colleagues at work outside working hours in the firm. He does not have a 
right to even interfere203. That in short is to say that individualism reigns supreme above 
every norm of social life.  
The ‘Third way’ 
1.8 The Common Good in Aristotelian­Thomistic Thought 
There seems to be a third way different from capitalism and communism. It is my opinion 
that the principles of the person and the society espoused by Adam Smith should be 
revised by turning towards the principle of the common good. In order to understand what 
society is, I plan to use Alvira’s ‘conceptography’ of the nature of society. Alvira locates 
the firm under the ambit of social institutions. It is inherent in the way he uses the term 
social justice that he refers to the way a society provides for and respects the rights and 
responsibilities of each person. Hence, the common good is the object of social justice and 
justice is a privileged example of the common advantage204. Institutions form the third 
conceptual level of society205. But what is the common good? 
The term ‘common good’ may refer to three things; the good of a nation or of a people; 
the good of the entire political community; and at times to the good of the entire 
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community of human beings in this world206. This arises from the manner in which the 
terms common advantage in Aristotle and common good in Aquinas are used. The 
common good (common advantage in Aristotle) often refers to the self sufficient political 
unit called the polis (city), in which all the community and each individual in the political 
community enjoy peace and friendship207. Aristotle says that the final good is thought to 
be self-sufficiency (or happiness – eudaimonia)...and by self-sufficient one does not mean 
that which is sufficient for a man by himself; one who lives a solitary life, but also for 
parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born 
for citizenship208. According to Aristotle the highest human action is the rational action 
and this has its term in Virtue. And if there is more than one virtue then the highest is the 
best and most complete 'in a complete life.'209 This common good of the whole political 
community is a final cause to which each citizen may have a part, and as a member of the 
political community can play a role to ensure that this tranquillity-in-order is achieved210.  
However, there is a common good (in Causando) that pertains to the whole ‘city’ (the 
world) and shared by each individual person while remaining a unity211. This is usually 
said of the ontological common good, which Aquinas states is God. In order to show the 
different manners in which the terms common good have been used and understood, I 
would like to use Michael Smith’s Schema of the term ‘Common Good’212. 
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Table 3: Schema of the Common Good Concept 
Common 
(De Veritate 7, 6, ad 7) 
By predication (in predicando): when some one thing is found 
in many according to one explanation 
By mode of cause (in causando); as remaining one in number, 
it extends to several effects. 
The Good (Aristotle, NE, 
1, 2, 30) 
The good of one person as the term of individual action. 
The common good: 
1.8.1.1 The common good of the whole political 
community 
1.8.1.2 The preservation of the Family 
The Common Good 
(With reference to the 
end; NE, 1,7, 95) 
1.8.1.3 Prior: Preservation of the political community 
1.8.1.4 Posterior: Related to what is owing to the end 
(bona communia: means) 
The Common Good 
(Analogy of one portion 
to diverse subjects; NE, 
1,7, 95) 
1.8.1.5 The good of the whole political community 
1.8.1.6 Preservation of the Family 
Source: Smith, Michael A.  Human Dignity and the Common Good in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition; p 
79 
When explaining fundamental concepts one is simply explaining explicitly what is already 
implicit in us213. In this sense, Alvira proposes that ‘Common’ means that which is prior to 
men in everything and that unites us as a whole. On the other hand the term ‘particular’ 
refers to the part each person participates in within the whole. The ‘common’ is therefore 
what each one aspires to and is indispensable; but since man is free, he can choose to deny 
it214. Everyone aspires naturally to the common good and it is greater than the individual 
since the whole cannot be subjected to the individual part. For instance, as Alvira says, 
one cannot subject friendship or truth to himself denying it to the rest215. Denying the 
common good on the other hand eliminates the possibility of adhering to the good. It 
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would be good to emphasise that the common good is at the same time the good of the 
whole and of each individual and the two go together analogously as a coin having two 
sides by nature. 
It is concluded in paragraph 1.4 above that according to Aristotle one can delineate some 
types of common goods. There are external goods, Internal goods and Aristotle adds an 
intermediate category between internal and external goods comprising of ‘goods of the 
body’, health, beauty, and strength. External goods preserve and protect internal goods. 
They are instrumental, and therefore their measure is the good specific and internal to 
human beings and their activity216. In conclusion, “Material well-being signifies, in as 
much as we are refereeing to the subject (subjectively speaking), ‘the self-expression of 
the human spirit in its bodily nature”217. Therefore, material well-being is meant to be a 
gift to everyone and it cannot be reduced to the individual as opposed to the others. It is 
the material things that should be reduced to the spirit rather than the spirit to matter. 
1.9 The Manner of the Common Good 
Peace is a fundamental gift of the common good to everyone. When there is a ‘state of 
peace’ there is freedom, acknowledgment, communication and sharing with each other, 
and finally men live in order and tranquillity. They are able to share the ‘common good’ 
among themselves (Justice), but they also share their own ‘particular goods’ with each 
other (Love). Love is a desire and therefore to love is to desire the good of the other as 
Aquinas says. Love remains sterile if there are no contiguous deeds to actualise it. 
Justice, on the other hand, is the lowest dimension of love because it is merely fulfilled by 
respecting the rights of the other within the common good. It is opposed to discord. 
Aquinas sees discord as something opposed to love, for he says, concord results from 
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charity, in as much as charity directs many hearts together to one thing; chiefly the Divine 
good and secondarily, the good of our society218. The Divine good is the ontological 
common good and the good of our neighbour is the practical common good of society. 
Where there is peace there is concord; but not the other way round since “peace is 
concord...through one man agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both 
of them. Peace is not ordinarily reinforced through coercion, “because the order of each 
concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason 
Augustine premises that "peace is tranquillity of order," which tranquillity consists in all 
the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest together.”219 
When there is peace in order there is unity. Unity is the effect of charity that peace seeks. 
Anything contrary to peace such as, Schism, strife, sedition and war, are contrary to unity. 
As the philosopher says, the sin of schism is one that is directly and essentially opposed to 
unity. For in the moral, as in the physical order, the species is not constituted by that 
which is accidental. Now, in the moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and 
that which results beside the intention, is, as it were, accidental. Hence, the sin of schism 
is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the reason that the schismatic intends to sever 
himself from that unity which is the effect of charity220. 
When there is order and tranquillity, there is also beauty. Aquinas explains that beauty 
relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen. 
Hence, beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly 
proportioned, as in what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of reason, 
just as is every cognitive faculty. Since knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates 
to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause221. This implies that since 
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a society by nature is inclined to order and unity and there is goodness arising from this 
perfection. In addition, something perfect in this manner is also beautiful. 
Common life, bound in justice and charity, allows each individual to pursue his or her 
particular good. This dynamic state is reinforced by the persistence of virtuous habits in 
the citizens. As we will see shortly in the ‘elect’ society, these virtuous habits must be 
grounded on the truth of man and society. Alvira says, changing truth or friendship 
whimsically, or trying to instrumentalize (subject) them to someone’s particular interests 
is to destroy them. One may, under certain circumstances, subjectively use what belongs 
to the public sphere without taking it away from public possession, but this cannot happen 
with Truth and Friendship222. Virtue in this framework is taught from one generation to 
another; transmitted primarily through family education; for it is in a ‘family environment’ 
that the virtue of charity is present in its most sublime state. The result is a universal social 
culture founded on the common good. 
1.10 Applying the Common Good to the firm 
Firms are analogously a type of society and have so many shapes and nuances and 
therefore it is very difficult to divine. Gonzalez’ seems in agreement with the thesis that 
defines a society as “the moral and stable union of a plurality which, with its actions, 
cooperates to the objectives or ends of a community”223. In this sense he explains, there 
are several elements that make up a society. 
a) First it is an organized multiplicity of members merely juxtaposed, 
b) secondly, there is a relationship within the plurality of persons, 
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c) thirdly, that the organization or ordering of the persons has a specific moral 
foundation, 
d) fourthly, that this moral union rests upon the cooperation of the members of the 
society towards a common end, freely instituted by conventional means, in such a 
way that the society is free and contingent or at times founded on a superior law 
necessary for the community, and 
e) fifthly, that the union of the persons should be stable, without necessarily being 
perpetual in nature, but having a sense of permanence224. 
From these one can surmise that in a firm there should be: 1) a plurality of individuals; b) 
who have an interpersonal relationship; c) based on a moral union (or a juridical bond), 
ordered to a common moral end, instituted by convention or law; d) stable in character 
without necessarily being perpetual, and e) ordered to the service of communities. Given 
the above attempt at the definition of the firm, the common end to which the firm intends 
is the practical common good of the political society as such. It manifests a state of peace, 
founded on justice, in which everyone member of the firm enjoys the external material 
goods acquired through virtuous activity. When the ends of the body and of the soul in a 
person attain their ends there is happiness. This is happiness is not a complete perfect 
happiness but it should drive us towards the most perfect happiness in the ontological 
common good. 
The firm in this case would be a means in which human beings cooperate in a virtuous life 
of work to enable them at the same time produce material goods necessary for such a 
virtuous life. This virtuous life in a firm should have as its highest point of reference, the 
ultimate good. The firm is therefore a means for participating in the common good of the 
polis and, in general, the totality of human society; the universal common good. This is 
                                                 
224 Cf. Sison, Alejo.J.G. and Fontrodona, Joan. The Common Good of the Firm in the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
Tradition; June, 2008 
86 
 
complicated since the society and the world are an extensive reality and obviously the firm 
cannot concern itself with every aspect of society. However, it still remains true that the 
firm does not have its beginning and end in itself. It has a reason for ‘being’ and that 
reason is the common good of society225. To take a stand for the common good is on the 
one hand to be solicitous for, and on the other hand to avail oneself of a complex of 
institutions that give structure to the life of society; juridical, civil, political, business and 
cultural, which make it the pólis. This is achieved by striving, through competence and 
cooperation,226 to provide for real needs of our society. The more they do this effectively 
the more they are loved227. 
1.11 On the Profit Motive of the Firm 
In a liberal free market environment an institution is required to maximize shareholder 
wealth or optimize stakeholder wealth. Hence, at the level of the firm, the most 
informative principle is profit and at the national level it is the productivity of the state or 
(per person) per capita income. It is most commonly found in western society, that the 
performance of the firm or any institution is judged by profit and wealth productivity. All 
other aspects of human actions and relationships within the firm seem to be subservient to 
this one. We may conclude that the highest good of any firm is widely seen as material 
wealth and more so money. Making money therefore becomes the bonding factor of 
relationships between human beings working in an organisation and with the instruments 
they use in doing their work. We can also conclude that the value of a person or tool is 
commonly measured by ‘its’ capacity to make profit or money. There arises a certain 
equalisation of everything in a capitalist firm; man, beast and material things are equally 
measured. The morality of all human actions is informed or underpinned by the desire for 
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However, since we measure a thing according to its true ends, the firm should be measured 
according to its adherence, sharing and preservation of the common good of the society 
where it operates. Although there is nothing intrinsically wrong with measuring monetary 
or financial performance from the point of view of profit or natural or artificial wealth 
produced, it would be a narrow way to comprehend a firm’s performance; it is a 
reductionism of all social values to monetary measures. Further, to reduce the common 
good to profit is in a sense to perceive what is ‘common’ only from the perspective of the 
individual. Therefore, in addition to this and in order to get a better picture of performance 
one also needs to measure whether the common is truly common. Other measures that may 
subscribe to this perspective include evaluating; 
a) technical, artistic and moral virtues, entrepreneurial initiative, creativity and 
cooperation among members of the firm. 
b) the usefulness of the goods and services as a legitimate service to the common 
good needs of society (not merely subjective satisfaction, although this is 
presupposed). 
c) discipline in upholding superior virtues for the common good such as justice. 
d) how well the firm represents its members in political debate to achieve higher 
levels of the common good; leisure, democratic deliberation and contemplation. 
This can be summarized as dialogue with society. 
e) the effectiveness of the common advantage enjoyed by the employees and indeed 
by all members of the firm. 
f) the goodness of the entire educational structure of the firm within itself and 
towards society. 
g) the leadership model and history of leadership effectiveness in the firm. 
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h) the effectiveness of the representation of all membership and general governance 
structures of the firm. 
i) Innovation as a dynamic principle of development in the firm. 
j) wholly and in general how subsidiarity and solidarity are lived within the firm. 
In effect, to make an ethical decision on whether to licence, invest or support a firm’s 
development or even allowing a firm to continue in existence for the benefit of society 
requires more than just monetary statistics. The ineffectiveness of the over dependence on 
quantitative data is evidenced from the fact that, for example, all firms which were 
involved in the 2008 financial mismanagement had been audited and given a ‘clean bill of 
health contrary’ to truth and justice. 
1.12 The ‘Elect Society’ 
For the purposes of this paper I call the society that lives in the dynamic state of seeking 
and preserving the common good the ‘elect’ society. Figure 3, below illustrates a possible 
structure of the elect society. The transcendental concepts, the categories and the social 
institutions are taken from Alvira’s conceptography229. For Aristotle, unity of the ‘elect 
society’ is wrought by the one who makes the constitution of a country. The constitution is 
not a written document, but an innate organizing principle, analogous to the soul of an 
organism. Hence, the constitution is also "the way of life" of the citizens230.  Although 
unity is wrought by the first principle of being, who is God; man has the challenge of 
cooperating through his freedom. 
According to Alvira, for there to be a society (what I have personally termed, elect 
society), there must be at the same time and in the same measure several transcendent 
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aspects: a) a history reflecting the time within which the society comes into being; b) a 
civilization signifying the people constituting the society; c) a subjective foundational 
knowledge (education) in each of the members which gives them a common perception of 
life; and d) an objective manifestation of this common education which he calls culture. 
Alvira also proposes elements or categories of society. They are; habitat, economics, law, 
politics, ethics and religion. These categories are the explicit principles which manifest the 
implicit transcendental aspects of society. For our purposes, the firm is an institution 
founded within the ‘economics’ category. 
The family is a primary institution of society which functions as the source and foundation 
for unity. Just like a person does not bring himself into existence but comes because of the 
action of another, a society comes into being not immediately from the will of the citizens 
themselves but rather from a principle beyond the mere individual choice to form society 
or the so called ‘social contract with society’. This foundation of the family is parenthood 
(or paternity) through which a creature is born and is called to a life in ‘common’. The 
society comes about as population augments, in time. Hence, for there to be a society, 
there must be a history and a culture (including a subjective education principle) of that 
society. As population augments the principles of parenthood and family remain at the 
foundation of society. Hence in turn, society gives the family possibilities of union with 
‘many’. It provides the source of relationships for the future couples, fostering life, love, 
education and development and finally the culture that develops reinforces the licitness 
and validity of society. A person cannot be without the gift of paternity. Neither is he 
useful without the family who provide him his primordial rights and responsibilities. 
‘Sociologically’, chronologically and ontologically it is the family first and then the nation 
and therefore any social institutions that emerges is the result of the family’s search for its 
own well-being. Seeing it from another perspective and analogically, one cannot be 
individuated in species (individuals) and at the same time the uniting principle of the 
genus (man designing the ‘genus’ of society – mankind). Hence, social reality demands 
something transcendental that gives it a unifying principle; and this is parenthood in the 
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widest sense of the term. This is what gives credence to the ‘unitiveness’ in the common 
good. The conclusion is that the unifying principle of society is not economics, but a 
flourishing life in common which derives from the first, formal and teleological principle 
of parenthood. 
Human parenthood does not merely act as the genesis of humankind (procreation). 
Parenthood is also solicitous for the intellectual and virtuous formation of its offspring. 
Education of children is made up of religion, morality and human virtues/ethics, the art of 
work and philosophy of life. Education proffers, in time, a common way of life or 
convivence in the society. From this principle comes the general notion of a nation made 
up of ‘brothers’ or a ‘tribe’; whereby brotherhood takes its nature from ‘patria’, the 
homeland. The notion of citizen in Aristotle and Aquinas does not include that of a slave. 
This terminology is rather oblique from our ordinary understanding of the words today. 
However, in trying to understand these words in Aristotle and Aquinas, one finds out 
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Figure 3: The Common Good Structure of Society 
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that the slave has no rights to participate in governance of the polis, while the citizens have 
this right ‘equally’. Aristotle says that ‘a constitutional state implies that the nature of the 
citizens are equal, and do not differ at all’231. Aquinas on the other hand says that in every 
people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the people's sovereign to his subjects; a 
second of the subjects among themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of 
members of the same household, such as the order of the father to his son; of the wife to 
her husband; of the master to his servant: and according to these four orders we may 
distinguish different kinds of judicial precepts in the Old Law232. Aquinas therefore does 
not seem to permit the concept of slave in ‘a people’ since a power is called despotic 
whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of 
the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that power is 
called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the 
government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which 
they can resist the orders of him who commands233. It seems clear that citizenship derives 
from being born in a family in a particular society from whence every citizen is equal to 
the other. One may acquire citizenship in a state outside this premise, but ultimately the 
rights he acquires are similar to those of the ‘child’ belonging to that society. The 
foreigner or slave (in Aristotle) in a society has no right because he is not born in that 
society or he has been ‘removed’ from the society by law. 
Normally, man goes to work and to play in the city or polis away from home. Someone 
can also leave for a foreign country in order to return home or to make a home where he 
goes. Work is the measure or channel of love an individual can offer in response to the 
good he has received in society. Work is always a way of going to get something for the 
home. This may either be food, drink and medicine for health, or to bring a wife home (to 
make a family), or to buy things for the home and many other things. It belongs to 
parenthood to provide the habitat (home) for the family. The home at times refers to 
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‘returning to one’s home country’; that is the place where my home is and which 
safeguards my right to the home. As Alvira explains, habitat comes from the Latin word, 
habitare, which is the continuous or frequentative tense of the word, habere, which means 
to have. Hence, to inhabit a place signifies possessing something continuously. As Alvira 
astutely points out, continuously having something is also to prevail over the passage of 
time with regard to the possession of something and therefore it is the best place; it is the 
only place to ‘return to’; it is my home where I inhabit.234 
Hence, going out to work is in a sense an extension of the home, of one’s interiority, of 
one’s intimacy, found in the home235. This gives work one of its most profound senses. 
From this analysis it results that the virtuous citizen can expose himself to the danger of 
death for the public good; and if man were a natural part of the city, then such inclination 
would be natural to him.236 Going to work has other meanings. While in one sense 
someone builds his home and looks after the well-being of the family, work also enables 
an individual share in common life with the others. Together a people build and preserve 
the common good of the nation through work. 
From this one derives the right to govern with the sovereign since one is born in, inhabits 
and works with others for the good of the nation. It is therefore proper to say that the 
principle of society precedes man and calls him - giving to him a vocation to work in the 
Family's abundance. One becomes valuable because of another. The other is family 
(dependents) first and then society. The vocation (or calling) to live in the ‘elect’ society 
comes freely and calls for a free response. It is freely given because it comes from 
parenthood which beckons for a free response in filiation. Hence, gratuitousness comes 
before justice as Benedict XVI says; the earthly city is promoted not merely by 
relationships of rights and duties, but to an even greater and more fundamental extent by 
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relationships of gratuitousness, mercy and communion237. The principle of gratuitousness 
is an expression of fraternity238, owing from the principle of paternity, from which all 
come to ‘be’ as a gift to the others239. 
How does one measure or ‘know’ or judge that another is contributing to the common 
good? Human work may be evaluated in two ways; by judging the morality of a person’s 
work (derived from family education) and by the contribution (a collaboration with others 
in doing something specific) made towards seeking and preserving the common good. 
Morality primarily contributes to the common good through social virtues. This is in 
reference to the object, intention and circumstances of one’s work or work ethic. All three 
aspects by which the ethical action is judged should be good with respect to oneself, the 
family and the society. As mentioned above with reference to Aquinas, the intention is the 
most important while the object and the circumstances are somewhat accidental in relation 
to the intention.  When someone is constant in adhering to the good in this manner he is 
said to be virtuous. When someone is virtuous he edifies and educates the others thereby 
contributing to the common good. 
The object of work, that is, the product or service is valuable based of the subjective 
happiness it grants to the individual and the contribution it makes to the happiness of the 
others who enjoy the object of one’s labour. The object of one’s labour enables us to 
measure the value of one’s moral action in a quantitative manner. It is therefore necessary 
to remember that monetary value cannot value the entire human effort or action. The 
moral intention and the circumstances are difficult to specify and hence are not measured. 
However, the goodness of the explicit object somehow manifests the implicit goodness of 
the interiority (the intention). Thus, it can be said that the fruits (off-spring) of a tree 
manifest its goodness or badness. The product or service is often measured monetarily for 
the purposes of exchange in the market place. 
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The market place as previously considered is that condition in society which allows for the 
exchange of goods and services. It is the economic complex that man in the polis goes to 
in order to fend for himself and for his family needs; and is manifested in complex modes. 
Aristotle, just as many other philosophers such as Albert the great (1200-1280), thought 
that the exchange of goods and services is a necessity for the existence of society240. In 
this sense the firm is an effective instrument for the production and exchange of goods and 
services in the market place. Albert the Great thought that the market exchange has to be 
just and that if it were not so, not only would it be unethical, but that social economic 
activity perishes, and so does society; since the exchange of material goods and services is 
necessary for the life of free citizens241. 
It belongs to our nature to possess. Human beings try to possess for the sake of their 
subjective needs and at the same time for others. Never can the two be separated at any 
level. That means, even when and individual possesses - I possess – it is always in order to 
make use of myself for the others. To possess material goods is not an end in itself, but a 
means to a more perfect end. This is a natural disposition and one cannot do without it, but 
one can freely reject it, although rejecting it means that the good that one is meant to be 
for the others is not there, and that is the definition of ‘evil’. Evil is a deprivation of one 
sort or the other or is something lacking in a thing that it ought to have242. Aristotle, 
Aquinas, John Paul II, Benedict XVI, Alvira, Michael Smith, Sison, Martínez-Echevarría, 
Prados, Lázaro, Jacque Maritain, De Koninck, Alfredo Cruz Prados and many others in the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition have agreed on this point; expressing it from different 
perspectives. It remains very true therefore that the greatest good of society is man 
working for the good others and himself. All the material goods are only good to one and 
to the others when they serve the one and the one serves the others. 
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Man’s perfection in being, as it appears from the authors, can therefore never be solely 
subjective (freedom). It is also objective for only then can he seek for it. If it were in 
himself man would be supposedly need very little and work very little and really there 
would be no development since he would not need woman, with whom paternity is 
perfected. The subjective and the objective good (perfection) that man seeks for the self 
and the others is given to him freely by paternity, but temporarily – in tempus – with 
regard to his state in a temporal a world. The particular common good can only be 
temporal, with regard to the earthly state, and therefore imperfect. In addition, the perfect 
means necessary to achieve the subjective and objective perfection should also be perfect 
in order to terminate in perfection. The means should be perfect because they have their 
formal and final cause in the perfect principle and final end. From whence man comes, 
there he too shall find his means and his ends. All the while in this world the means and 
the participatory perfections are temporal. The perfection of the temporal is in the eternal. 
While one seeks the good temporarily, it remains temporal and therefore imperfectly 
participative of the eternal. The eternal principle, formal and final end is the ontological 
common good as Aquinas and Millán-Puelles show. 
What is therefore needed in the world, as Benedict XVI proposes, is an effective shift in 
mentality which can lead to the adoption of new life-styles in which the quest for truth, 
beauty, goodness and communion with others for the sake of common good is re-
invigorated. This should affect the economy in every aspect including, factors which 
determine production, services, consumer choices, savings and investments243 and 
consumer behaviour. The structures of the firm which aid the common good are many and 
varied depending on the circumstances of society. Firms are advised of the need to 
embrace the principle of the temporal common good as a path towards the most perfect 
subjective and objective common good. From the foregoing analysis the firm should strive 
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for its own subjective good but this subjective good (its particular good) is found in 
serving the objective good (the common good). In seeking the middle path between these 
two goods, the firm discovers its ‘virtuous’ life. 
Civilization of the polis is derived from the orderly configuration of the community of 
people within a given and particular land space (topos)244. From these one derives the 
norm of society; of living together (habitat). Alfredo Cruz Prados explains this reality 
efficaciously when considering Aristotle’s dimensions of the polis245. Human beings 
convert the wilderness (nature without man) for the family to live on and then ultimately 
the whole community of the polis (spatial ethos). The political community is so called 
because of life in the polis. This happens when the land is allocated to each according to 
his or her needs. This could be considered the allocation of individual rights of inhabiting, 
allocated by the person chosen to lead the primordial society. The leader is often the 
household head who governs royally246 according to Aristotle and Aquinas. As Alfredo 
Cruz points out, political life in common receives its form from the ordering of the space 
in which the community is settled. This political life once nurtured gives form to common 
life. If someone is not bound to this physical space then ordinarily one looses the formal 
capacity of political common life. He also adds that in the polis the family law is 
substituted with the law of the land in the polis247 (Ius sanguinis for the ius solis). 
That is not to say that the family law is forsaken; but rather, since in the polis there is a 
community (or communion with others strictly outside the bonds of close consanguinity), 
it is governed with the ius solis and the ius solis presupposes the ius sanguinis from 
whence it is derived. It is thus that the relationship of fraternity in the polis takes the 
nature of the family relationships – Confraternity. Every social institution of the polis is in 
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turn formed according to the nature of the law of the land. It is the responsibility of the 
government to arbitrate or administrate justice for the whole of the polis. 
The polis has to be organised and the space that belongs to the whole community needs to 
be taken care of. It is the responsibility of government judiciary system to organise 
ownership and distribution of land, housing, communication channels, environmental care 
and relationships with another foreign nations and similar responsibilities. It does this on 
behalf of the citizens and keeping in mind the common good. More often than not, due to 
mankind’s defectiveness, there are always people who do not have the capacity to fulfil 
the responsibilities that derive from the rights granted to them in the polis or sometimes 
misuse them so that they lose their rights. The government of the polis has a responsibility 
to give consideration, educate and provide for them. Hence there are three arms of 
government; viz, the executive, the judiciary, and those who promulgate the law, the 
legislature. Leadership in the polis cannot confound the three arms because that would 
breed a propensity to tyranny. 
Civilization in the polis is not a mere convivence among men made up of a sum total of 
individuals living together. Rather the unity and perfection deriving from convivence is far 
greater than the sum-total of each individual’s good or right. This is the perfection arising 
from enjoying the common good. For example, if before each individual or family, in so 
far as they remained individuals or families, did not have bodily strength or intellectual 
knowledge, to carry out a task, it remained undone. But convivence, living together for 
one another in friendship, enables them carry out that greater task which each could not do 
individually. Another name for it is synergy and it is simply defined by the phrase; the 
whole is greater than the sum total of its individual parts. In society, each part, if living 
within the spirit of the common good, is like a joint that is fitted into the whole making the 
whole stronger, by each adding its own strength. The peace that the common good 
provides binds everything together. Each on its part has, in addition, the responsibility of 
guarding that peace. Anything to the contrary would be the destruction of the whole and 
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therefore of the parts in the long run. Thus man collaborates with and preserves the 
common good. 
Administration of justice and order for the common good is arduous and requires both 
virtuous and material well-being. It requires virtuous leaders and strong men. It needs 
money and such other devices necessary for obtaining and preserving the common good 
just as a household, or much more so; hence some public men devote themselves entirely 
to finance248. The firm has helped realise this outcome. The firm should do this freely in so 
far as it respects the common good. 
Other social institutions not mentioned above include, technical and university education, 
security, history, cultural, moral and religious institutions. The institutions as organized by 
Alvira seem to take their order and raison d’être according to the distinct perfective ends 
or goods of man; each part contributing to the whole rather than working separately. It is 
fundamental that all institutions, including the firm collaborate for the common good and 
the universal good always in reference to the family. As Alvira explains, each institution 
contains all the social categories249 and a business is not a mere economic entity, but one 
which has an implicit religion, ethics, polity, law, economy and habitat. The highest of the 
institutions is the state or government; and in every structure, institution and individual 
there is a leader or head so there is a leader of the state. 
The leader may derive his or her mandate in many ways but the true leader must above all 
be legitimate, that is, one whose authority is recognised as such by the citizens. Since the 
ordering of the polis has its term in the common good of the citizens, the leader is 
legitimate when he or she is apt and can enhance the common good. Legitimacy gives 
credence to the power exercised by the leader otherwise it is despotic. Although there are 
bad people and hence the need of using legitimate violence to restore order and peace, this 
‘monopoly’ of violence is not what grants leaders legitimacy, as Hobbes thought. 
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When a person with power acknowledges and is persuaded (that is, he accepts the right of 
power to rule, called upon him by the people), he has authority over the people, but he 
should not confuse this legitimacy with the authority he has although they arise from the 
same fountain, his capacity to power.  Suffice it to say that when a leader or potent 
confuses his legitimacy with his authority it often results in despotism. Legitimacy has to 
be continually renewed250. There is an old dictum that says “power corrupts, and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely”. The root cause of corruption arises when a leader confounds 
his authority with his legitimacy. We can now proceed to the specific conclusions of what 




                                                 






The firm or the business is a type of the social institution, a community, which enables 
persons work together and thereby participate in and preserve the common good. It is part 
of those institutions that provide the stable bond subsisting between communities and 
persons, where communities arise primarily from the family institution and its extension in 
the ‘household’. All social institutions share in this nature. The complexity of operating 
large enterprises by individuals or families is prohibitive, especially because the size of the 
firm is the result of the cooperation between many constituents. The “firm” provides the 
optimum structure that can enable persons adhere to justice – that is, recognise others 
rights and be a stock of multiple rights respecting each distinct right251. The law in 
different states is specific and to a large extent formulates the just operation of simple or 
complex firms; it defines the rights and duties of those operating under the umbrella of the 
firm. The legal instruments that provide this law range from, company law, accounting 
and auditing professional laws, the general contract law, the law of tort as it affects these 
institutions and ultimately, every law of the land that is applicable to the firm. The 
professional frameworks for the financial operation of the firm are provided by legal 
professional associations such as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
the General Accounting and Auditing Professional Standards (GAAP) and similar 
institutions in most countries. The firm is also subservient to the laws and regulations 
stipulated in various labour institutions belonging to the government, the employers and 
the workers unions, and international trading rules. It is therefore, completely inserted in 
the complex of universal social structures that try to ensure justice and peaceful universal 
social convivence. Nevertheless, the laws which address the norm of justice in society are 
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not enough. Man’s gratuitousness is necessary for as Benedict XVI points out justice is not 
possible without gratuitousness. The earthly city is promoted not merely by relationships 
of rights and duties, but to an even greater and more fundamental extent by relationships 
of gratuitousness, mercy and communion252. 
1.13.2 Distinctiveness of the Firm in the ‘Elect’ Society 
Based on the discussion above, the common good firm may be distinguished as shown 
below; 
1.13.2.1 It is an institution that bridges or provides a stable bond between different 
communities and families, where communities arise primarily from the 
family institution and its extension into the ‘household’. If it provides the 
well-being of many families in society then it is (from a common good 
perspective) more important than any one of the individual families. 
However, it is as important as the families it serves in societies, made up of 
both internal associative members and external collaborative relationships; all 
within a just system. 
1.13.2.2 The firm generally takes its exemplariness from the household management 
in structure and operations and the ‘parenthood’ relationships of Justice and 
gratuitousness. The firm qua firm and its constituents (or members)253 are 
subjects of the law since they have real rights and responsibilities 
(gratuitousness presupposes the concept of Love). With regard to distributive 
justice, the role of the firm is to equitably distribute rights and duties, rewards 
and punishments within the internal forum. The Chief Executive Officer’s 
role (the leader) is much like that of the leader of a household in uniting 
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members and distributing justice. With regard to commutative justice, the 
firm has to fulfil its explicit contractual obligations internally to its 
constituents and externally to the society. This presupposes the fulfilment of 
implicit contractual obligations which are indispensable if it is to fulfil the 
explicit obligations. Fulfilling implicit obligations is a sign that the explicit 
ones are in good order. It operates as a concrete social institution made up of 
owners, managers and workers who have a stable relationship of co-operation 
in ends and means. 
1.13.2.3 It has a habitat254 (home) just like a family although at the service of the 
family. This refers to its locus or domicile where it receives its ‘being’ and 
identity255. 
1.13.2.4 It has its own material ‘rights’ or assets and duties (obligations) of a material 
and immaterial nature (they are also referred to as economic resources and 
there are many types depending on the object of the firm – This is primarily 
in reference to the internal constitutive nature of a firm); 
1.13.2.5 It can be a ‘public’ or ‘private’ institution, but is always at the service of its 
constituents and the public, just as any family or person. Public and private 
here are defined by variation in number. Public refers to that which belongs 
to or is said of a greater or lesser group of persons. Private refers to that 
which is sequestered or set aside for a particular person, family or association 
of persons256; 
1.13.2.6 Its explicit nature is specified in its articles and memorandum of association, 
but it also has implicit responsibilities to society which arise from the 
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dynamic relationship with its environment – (This is an internal constitutive 
final end similar to the concept of ‘vocational dimension’). From the 
common good perspective, the objectives of the firm embedded in the articles 
and memorandum of association should strive to satisfy two primary 
principles: First, is that the ends and the means should be perfective of 
society, that is, they should be serving a need in society, which would 
enhance and preserve the common good of society. Secondly, and although 
implicit in the first, its ends and means should be universally accepted as 
good moral actions. Hence, the principle of the common good foresees both 
the good of the firm’s domicile state and the global or universal common 
good. Common good is a universal principle and applies to the universal 
society of humankind as well as to subsidiary states. 
1.13.2.7 The dynamic and stable cooperation among the members or constituents in 
working towards a particular service to society requires education in all its 
dimensions; moral education and technical development through human 
resource development. In the firm, a good and fruitful life in common is 
primarily realised through education in moral actions (ethics), since only in 
true ethical actions can justice and gratuitousness prevail. The late John Paul 
II, saw civil society as the most natural setting for an economy of 
gratuitousness and fraternity257. Benedict XVI reiterates that “economic life 
must be understood as a multi-layered phenomenon: in every one of these 
layers, to varying degrees and in ways specifically suited to each, the aspect 
of fraternal reciprocity must be present. In the global era, economic activity 
cannot rescind from gratuitousness, which fosters and disseminates solidarity 
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and responsibility for justice and the common good among the different 
economic players”258. 
1.13.2.8 However, any relationships that arise externally in society are also informed 
by this transcendent principle of education. Education in its widest meaning 
is the entirety of learning and knowledge in society. It can build or destroy a 
society. Every human interaction and dialog between persons in a society has 
an educative dimension. Constancy in right education is necessary in order 
for values to inhere and the right culture to emerge. Therefore any 
communication internally and externally needs to be informed and cognizant 
of the fundamental principles of morality. There should also be a system of 
moral appraisal within a just structure. This forms the foundations of 
‘business ethics’. 
1.13.2.9 Good education systems within firms engender innovation and continuous 
learning in the widest meaning of the term. It is also the foundation of a 
learning organization; that is, firms in which members internally and 
externally, continuously improve their moral actions (including technical 
ones, because these are not indifferent to morality). 
1.13.2.10Fundamental to moral education (ethics) inherent in every communication 
between persons within and outside the organization, is ‘religion’. Religion is 
here defined as the principle measure of moral actions. Although its role is 
not to teach religion, but it is nevertheless true that a ‘religion’ is presupposed 
in moral actions. Moral actions cannot do without a religion – or the mother 
principle from which all actions find their merit or demerits. Sadly, the 
religion in many firms, though ‘unspoken’ explicitly, is loudly implied. For 
instance, when a firm educates its members that the fundamental principle is 
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profit, or productivity, or market growth, or any such means, then it is 
implicit that this is the religion and all other principles are subservient to this 
one. Hence, harsh working conditions, disrespect of other religions, implicit 
disdain of the true dignity of man at the altar of profits, anti-family policies, 
inequality in the distribution of resources, and so on are a very eloquent proof 
of what the religion really is. 
1.13.2.11What if one were to submit to the Smithian principle of allowing instincts or 
passions to be the judges devoid of the use of right reason? Automatically the 
religion is ‘pleasure’ (even irascible passions presuppose the passions of the 
concupiscible faculty259) as these are the objects of human passions or 
instincts; much like those of an irrational animal. Pleasure, properly 
speaking, is perfectly in line with the Smithian principle of prudent action as 
explained earlier. From the common good perspective on the other hand, 
right reason, and not instinct or passions, must prevail as the ‘motor’ of 
human actions. The instincts or passions should be informed by or serve right 
reason. 
1.13.2.12The broader the ‘community’ of the firm is, the greater the need for applying 
the principle of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity enhances bonding in the firm. The 
effectiveness of these bonds is for the good of the individual, the family and 
as a result the firm qua firm. The bond is organic rather than static as Antonio 
Argrandoña points out260. According to George Garvey, subsidiarity 
encourages decisions to be made at the lowest appropriate level within the 
enterprise thereby enhancing individual dignity or sense of freedom and 
independence throughout the enterprise. It imposes responsibility for 
decisions on those who should best understand the consequences, economic 
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and moral, of their choices. While subsidiarity should touch every level of the 
organization, be it one of ownership, hiring, management, or labour; it should 
provide for the necessary unity of operations261. Subsidiarity also reduces the 
chances of developing an insensitive bureaucratic system. 
1.13.2.13Solidarity should be the consequence of subsidiarity. Well organized and 
effective subsidiarity enhances a sense of responsibility for the whole 
organization. Quoting John Paul II, Garvey points out that “Solidarity helps 
us to see the ‘other’—whether a person, people, or nation, not just as some 
kind of instrument… discarded when no longer useful, but rather as a sharer 
and collaborator262. Solidarity is therefore cognizant of the human dignity of 
every person and comprehends that efficiency in a firm’s operations takes 
into account legitimate participation in the common good of society. In its 
widest meaning, solidarity also encourages the wise use of earth’s resources 
for the common good of society. Laura and Schmidpeter have found out that 
both subsidiarity and solidarity help build up the local networks for 
organizations in the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) sectors263. 
1.13.2.14Organisational culture crystallizes over time given the underlying continuous 
moral or ethical education provided by the firm and when solidarity and 
subsidiarity are effectively enhanced. As mentioned in paragraph 3.2 of this 
document there is a battle between human dignity, founded on cultural 
norms, and material well-being since there is a tendency to consider them as 
mutually exclusive. Building a culture that enhances human dignity calls one 
to consider the entire frame work of religion, ethics, history and traditions, 
                                                 
261 Garvey, George E., The Theory of the Firm, Managerial Responsibility, and Catholic Social Teaching; 
Journal of Markets & Morality, Volume 6, Number 2 (Fall 2003): 525–540: P 533 
262 Garvey, George E., The Theory of the Firm, Managerial Responsibility, and Catholic Social Teaching; p 
534 
263 Spence, Laura and Schmidpeter, René. Social Capital and the Common Good; Journal of Business Ethics, 
Vol. 45, No. 1/2, 15th Annual Eben Conference: "Sustaining Humanity Beyond Humanism" (Jun., 2003), 
pp. 93-108: p 106 
109 
 
education, philosophy, values, art, artefacts, and entertainment. There is 
already a sense among some rational organizational behaviour theorist that 
there needs to be developed a realignment of organization theory bringing 
together theoretical approaches to power, culture, and agency264. The 
conclusion is that in order to have a culture truly responsive to the social 
common good the most important pillar is effective and consistent moral 
education founded on the perfect ontological common good on the one hand 
and human dignity on the part of the practical social common good. That 
means that organizational culture should not merely support the company’s 
sources of financial strength, strategic fit, market position, industry rank and 
product rankings and, adapting its core human competencies to market 
conditions as understood by the capitalist firm. This would be one sided 
according to the principle of the common good. Organizational culture must 
ultimately fit the common good of the society in which it operates in every of 
its facets; human dignity, family dignity, social concordance, environmental 
responsibility and the preservation of the common good. 
1.13.2.15According to Alvira, civilization signifies the convivence of people 
constituting the society. Hence, the firm is part of the civilization of a society 
which enables human beings as individuals and as a whole flourish within a 
framework of justice, order, material and cultural well-being. The firm 
should provide useful and decent working conditions for the citizenry; it fits 
into and enhances the good cultural context of the society it is situated and it 
enhances the material well-being of that society. In summary, the firm has to 
be in society as a protagonist for human development and social cohesion. 
The core elements that enable this reality are the development of competence 
in the organization and cooperation; subsidiarity and solidarity. A civilized 
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society is necessarily unitary; it has cohesion. It does not exist in any other 
way. Considering it from another perspective, competency is the means of 
developing society while cooperation is its term or end or objective. The 
means are as necessary as the ends. Competency is in the first place but 
should not be an end. When cooperation in society is the goal then 
competency is good for humanity. Cooperation is an act of solidarity and 
subsidiarity at once and the same time and therefore seeks the good of the 
other not destruction265. To take a stand for the common good is on the one 
hand to be solicitous for, and on the other hand to avail oneself of, that 
complex of institutions that give structure to the life of society, juridical, 
civil, political and cultural, making it the pólis, or “city”. The more one 
strives to secure a common good corresponding to the real needs of his 
neighbours, the more effectively he loves them266. 
1.14 Measuring a Firm’s Performance 
From the common good perspective of the firm the performance of a firm has to be 
measured from the perspective of the social common good and the particular good it helps 
to accomplish. Profit is only a measure of artificial wealth and therefore is a measure of 
one aspect of the goods man desires. It is not even wealth but the potential representation 
of natural wealth. To reduce the entire structure of human good to a measure of artificial 
wealth is a reductionism that leaves man rather hollow and bereft of his core fundamental 
values. The firm, in so far as it is a social instrument for the common good, could to take 
into consideration in addition such measures as; 
a) Its contribution to both staff and social education/knowledge 
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b) Its objective common good contribution of individual and social cultural goods  
c) Its contribution to good civilization and convivence 
d) Its contribution to the material just well-being of staff and citizens within and 
order of relationships. 
e) Its contribution to justice and peace in the firm and in society. Ubi societas, ibi 
ius: every society draws up its own system of justice. If there is charity, then 
there is justice. Not only is justice not extraneous to charity, not only is it not 
an alternative or parallel path to charity: justice is inseparable from charity267. 
Justice is the primary way of charity or, in Paul VI's words, “the minimum 
measure” of it. To desire the common good and strive towards it is a 
requirement of justice and charity268. 
f) Its cooperation and collaboration with government initiatives. It is not enough 
to pay taxes because this is measured from the profit generated; the profit on 
the other hand could be made from very subversive actions against the 
common good of the citizens. 
g) Its productivity of goods and services, their development and innovation in 
accord with the common good. Customer satisfaction is not broad enough to 
capture the nature of alignment with the common good. 
h) Its dialogue with society from the perspective of politics; especially in its 
capacity as a representative of the members who form the company. 
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New methods of assessing the performance of the firm and indeed the state need to be 
generated in order to be more specific and accurate about a firm’s contribution to the 
common good of society and its efforts to sustain this common good. With regard to the 
firm, Llano and Cifuentes’ work on the currently dominant values and the transcendental 
values of the firm or corporation is appropriate as a starting point. Llano mentions that the 
parameters of assessing the contemporary firm are; The Mission or ultimate objective of 
the firm, basic employee aptitudes, a firm’s strategic vision, business objectives, human 
resource development and environmental forces269. The firm’s response to these dominant 
parameters is replete with what Llano calls ‘Taylorism’, that is, they are based on the 
scientific management theory of Frederic Winslow Taylor. The modern capitalist 
responses are what Llano calls the dominant values of the contemporary corporation; they 
are respectively, given the parameters above; Maximisation of profit, the desire to acquire 
and to possess, strategic results orientation, achieving primary strategic objectives, career 
growth and Satisfaction. On the contrary, based on the perspective of the common good, 
the responses should be, again respectively; service to society, creativity and sharing, 
discovering new principles of action, foreseeing secondary effects, inclusion, and self 
domination270. The underlying impetus of the organisation as a whole and the individual 
members within should ultimately be subsidiarity and solidarity with the whole 
organisation and with the society according to Llano’s responses above. 
1.15 Summary 
It is complex for business institutions to strive for and preserve the common good. If one 
confines his vision to what the history of mankind portrays, then there is reason to be 
pessimistic. It may be that as Seneca once said, “It isn’t that we don’t dare because things 
are difficult; it is that we don’t dare that they are difficult." Nevertheless, when institutions 
are enclosed within their own past, present and future, they will obscure an objective end 
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which must serve as its measure and goal. The very tools for achieving this seemingly 
insurmountable goal are human reason and human instinct informed by right reason, and 
prudent action, which have been present throughout history. What new capacity do these 
gifts to mankind have in order to achieve the universal good of society that they did not 
have in history? This thesis points to a certain urgent and necessary change in the way 
firms are set-up and evaluated. 
The firm as a community of persons has always tried to play a fundamental role in 
construction of effective and efficient markets in society for the common good. The true 
battle in history has always been fought between the healthy optimism and ‘pathological’ 
pessimism of achieving that perfection within the universal good of human society. 
History is full of both mankind’s divisive attitude (individualism as an end) and his 
undying effort to develop the person and the society in solidarity. It is necessary to be 
optimistic in the pursuit of the universal common good; by the constant and perennial 
dynamic of reason informed by truth (right reason); and by concrete actions in business 
informed by that truth. 
Capitalism, much like communism, has not constructed the peaceful and just society as the 
state of the world today indicates. It may be that while human wisdom has tried to destroy 
any kind of tyranny in society, it has swung to the other extreme and forgotten that not all 
authority is tyranny. Adam Smith’s vision is yet to be proven. Mankind cannot perfect 
himself and his society solely with institutions or on the foundations of his free instinct or 
passions or what Smith called ‘sympathy’; devoid of any ordering. To seek that which our 
reason and will manifest as perfect and therefore ‘beyond’ us; that perfection which one 
sees with the light of his informed soul, is the true path that reason should continue 
following. It is an exciting objective because one is usually happy when the ‘other’ is 
happy. The society is flourishing when one and the ‘other’ is flourishing. One is satisfied 
when he goes beyond his own good to contribute to the good of the other. The society is 
wholesome when all collaborate loyally to a common objective for the common good. 
Society enjoys eudaimonia when all tend to be happy and the whole body is healthy. 
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Hence, leadership in the common good urgently needs wise leaders engaging the wisest 
counsellors to advice and administrate; not those with the greatest monetary wealth or 
popularity. Neither can the wisdom of organizing society be left to large impersonalized 
bureaucratic systems so that decisions are never made on time. For firms to go forward 
they are better of respecting the variety in unity of society, by adhering to the transcendent 
true principles of man and society. The ultimate happiness is that which, if any person 
attains, one can desire nothing further. It is that highest of all good things, and it embraces 
in itself all good things. Therefore happiness is a state which is made perfect by the union 
of all good things271. 
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